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ABSTRACT 
 
Land is a valuable resource in Hong Kong where only there is a small 
amount of buildable land relative to its large population. Under the town 
planning appeal system in Hong Kong, the attitude of the Appeal Board is 
vital for the allocation of land resources for development. However, the 
hostile attitude towards market is found in Appeal Board decisions. 
Part I of this dissertation, reviews the aims and effects of urban 
planning in terms of the legal, social, and economic aspects. 
In part II, identified and discusses the approaches of different writers 
on urban planning issues.  
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: ASPECTS OF TOWN PLANNING 
 
Since 1997, Hong Kong has been governed by Basic Law which is 
tinctures a system of “constitutional capitalism”1. Efficiency allocation of 
resources should therefore be determined by market forces. The attitude of 
Appeal Board towards market becomes crucial for land owners. If the 
Appeal Board holds a hostile market attitude, the property rights of land 
owners are threatened, as this means that rights to use and to derive income 
from the piece of land, which provide incentives for developers to carry out 
land development, could be attenuated. Land value would decrease 
accordingly.  
Under “Constitutional Capitalism”2the Appeal Board should consider 
property rights and economic considerations as well as reduce transaction 
costs and maximize social wealth when deciding any appeal case. 
                                                 
1 Lai, L. W. C. “Planning and Property Rights in Hong Kong under Constitutional  
Capitalism”. International Planning Studies 7, no. 3 (2002): 213-225. 
 
2 Ibid. 
 2 
Economic Aspects--Pigovian Paradigm3 
 Pigou’s “The Economic of Welfare” referred to the expression of the 
concept of externalities and public goods that was part of the terminology of 
welfare economics. 4   Externality arises when the act of one party to a 
construct causes the stranger to the contract to suffer without compensation, 
or conversely, when a party that is not under contract benefits from the act of 
another party without remuneration.  The former is called a negative 
externality, while the latter is a positive one5.  Hence, the Pigovian Paradigm, 
as Pigou’s idea is called, traditionally describes pollution as a kind of 
negative externality, while an example of a positive externality is a newly 
built housing estate that increases market demand for pre-existing corner 
shops.  Such uncompensated costs and benefits will create economic 
inefficiency.  This is because most individuals only consider private costs 
and benefits.  Thus, the market will fail to equate marginal use value and 
                                                 
3 Lai, L.W.C. “The Economics of Land Use Zoning: A Literature Review and Analysis  
of the Work of Coase,” Town Planning Review. 65,  no.1(1994a): 77-98 and  
Lai, L.W.C. Zoning and property rights : a Hong Kong case study Hong Kong :  
Hong  Kong University Press, 1996. 
 
4 The other two major sources of market failure are public goods and monopolies. 
 
5 This definition of externalities emphasizing contractual relationship is adopted by Lai  
(1994a). 
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marginal social costs, which is a required condition for Pareto efficiency6.  
Pigovian Economists therefore argue that the state or government should 
intervene in the market so as to correct the inefficiency. 
In light of the Pigovian Paradigm, town planning arose.  It tried to 
tackle public dissatisfaction with tort remedies.  Land use planners attempted 
to correct market failures caused by externalities through several ways7: 
 
I. separating incompatible activities to restrict negative externalities 
by buffer zones;  
II. integrating compatible activities via mixed use zoning; and  
III. encouraging positive and restricting negative externalities by way 
of development control measures.  No matter which methods were 
used, the aim of zoning is to correct market failures of externality 
through physical control.  
Another reason for the rise of urban planning is the welfare concept 
that certain goods should be provided by the government, for instance, parks.  
Public goods are those goods or services in which insufficient amounts are 
produced through market transactions.  It is because the free market is 
believed to be uninterested in providing adequate amounts.  The rationale 
behind this is that for certain types of goods, exclusive consumption will 
come with high costs.  Thus, joint consumption is more preferable to most 
                                                 
6 In 1897 Vilfredo Pareto identified a condition of resource allocation that was later  
named after him.  An allocation is considered Pareto-efficient if it cannot make  
some people better off and nobody worse off when moving to another kind of  
resource allocation.  
 
7 Lai, L.W.C., “The Role of Land Use Planning-An Economic Exposition” The Hong  
Kong Surveyor 3 (no.2, 1987): 6-9. 
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people.  Besides, their consumption does not decrease the amount available 
to others.  Highways, bridges, and parks are common examples of public 
goods.  The allocation of those goods requires zero pricing for achieving 
allocation efficiency, and this deters the private sector.  Moreover, free 
riders exist, as consumers would pretend that they have no demand for those 
goods, hoping that other consumers will pay for them8.  This results in a 
situation in which no market demand and supply exist. 
Simply put, consumers are not willing to pay, while producers are not 
willing to produce.  Hence, it is argued that there is a need for stating 
provision and hence land use planning to reserve land for them as well.  
Planners reserve land use zones for the development of community services 
in accordance with planning standards and policies like that for roads and 
public open spaces to supplement private supply, if any.  More precisely, 
Open Spaces and Government/Institution/Community (GIC) zones, as 
stipulated in Hong Kong’s statutory plans, are measures to address public 
goods problems.  This Pigovian pro-intervention tradition has been well 
received by planning practitioners and involves the education of planners.  
Pigou was not the only one to suggest the use of government intervention to 
correct market failures.  Buchanan and Tullock (1975), in their review of the 
                                                 
8 Some arguments have arisen because of the existence of taxes.  However, most  
economists agree that public goods do exist. 
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Pigovian Theory, suggested that physical controls like quotas are more 
suitable in some situations.  Although another welfare economics concept 
was proposed by Samuelson9 to justify land use planning, it has rarely been 
attempted.  
The Coasian Paradigm10 
Coase’s articles “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960)11  and “The 
Lighthouse in Economics” (1974) 12  challenged, respectively, the market 
failure concept of “Externalities” and “Public goods” (Lai 1997).  The term 
“Coase Theorem” was invented by Stigler (1966),13 who based it on the 
works of Coase, the winner of Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991.  
With regard to externalities, Coase highlighted the reciprocal nature of 
externalities, and showed that the free trade of pollution rights would 
automatically lead to optimum levels in the absence of “transaction costs”.  
                                                 
9 Paul, A Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus Marcoeconomics. New York: McGraw- 
Hill, 1995. 
 
10 Lai, L.W.C. “The Economics of Land Use Zoning: A Literature Review and Analysis  
of the Work of Coase,” Town Planning Review. 65,  no.1(1994a): 77-98 and  
Lai, L.W.C. “The Property Rights Justifications for Planning and a  
Theory of Zoning”. Progress in Planning. 48, no.3 (1997): 161. 
 
11 Coase, Ronald H. “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics  
(October 1960): 1-40.  
 
12 R.H. Coase, “The Lighthouse in Economics,” Journal of Law and Economics 17,  
(October 1974): 357-376. 
 
13 G.J. Stigler, Theory of Price. London: Macmillan, 1966, pp.111. 
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Those transaction costs refer to the cost of enforcing payments, information, 
competition, and negotiation.  Cheung (1990)14 further elaborated that: 
 
If property rights are clearly delineated, and if all costs of transactions 
are zero, then resource use will be the same regardless of who owns 
the property rights. 
 
This invariant version of the Coase Theorem implies that Pigovian 
market intervention is unnecessary, as the market can tackle externalities 
when transaction costs are zero or low.  Coase continuously explained his 
theory in “The Federal Communications Commission” (1959):15 
 
The delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market 
transactions…the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of 
production) is independent of the legal decision.  
 
A famous example from Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost” is his 
point that if transaction costs are zero, then both parties (the cattle raiser and 
wheat farmer) could resolve their conflict of interest in their rights to use 
their land by internalizing externalities through private contracts for trading 
their rights.  The resource allocation will be the same no matter who made 
the initial endowment to whom.  
                                                 
14 Steven N.S. Cheung, On the New Institutional Economics (Discussion Paper Series No.  
118) Hong Kong: Department of Economics, University of Hong Kong, 1990. 
 
15 R.H. Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission” The Journal of Law and  
Economics (October 1959): 1-44.  
See also Lai, L.W.C. “The Property Rights Justifications for Planning and a  
Theory of Zoning”. Progress in Planning. 48, no.3 (1997): 161. 
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Coase’s parable stated that the Pigovian model does not exist in the 
absence of transaction costs.  In the Pigovian Theory, positive and negative 
externalities are formed by one party who is blamed directing to a land use 
conflicts scenario. Coase argued that both parties would be able to identify 
their maximum joint output and income.  Then they could decide how to 
share their income by means of voluntary private contracts.  In other words, 
the market can internalize such uncompensated effects (externalities) in the 
absence of transaction costs.  The problem of externality could be regarded 
as an unclear delineation of property rights in land use. 
Coase went on to explain that the market does not aim for zero 
nuisances.  The parties involved decide which party should be harmed, so as 
to avoid the more serious harm that may emerge.  In addition, Coase 
identified that market failure doesn’t exist, as the parties can trade their 
rights freely, and resolve their problems by way of joint and individual 
wealth maximization.  Thus, an efficient level of resource allocation is 
achieved.  In this situation, the assignment of legal rights or liabilities to 
another people only affects the distribution of income between two parties, 
and the direction of compensation payment for the forbearance of others’ 
activities.  Neither the total output of return nor the total incomes derived 
from these activities are affected by the change of arrangements.  
 8 
In regards to public goods, in his article “The Lighthouse in 
Economics,” Coase illustrated that the private sector could produce public 
goods on a profit making basis using direct pricing.  Government taxation 
does not have a prior need, which is a kind of indirect pricing, to fund public 
facilities.  Coase’s attitude towards the impossibility of securing payment 
was unbelievable when he said that the human habit of following armchair 
speculation was tested by empirical facts.  This argument has its limitations.  
The lighthouse example was simply a historical case study directed at Paul 
Samuelson’s theory about lighthouse as public goods.  This case could not 
be universally attempted.  In the real world, there are cases where 
transaction costs are prohibitively high. 
Lai (1997a)16 provided an example of road pricing.  The cost of toll 
fee collection is too high and prevents the direct pricing method from being 
used.  Therefore, in certain situations the operation of the visible hand may 
be more beneficial (e.g. town planners may provide a less costly alternative 
to private negotiations).  Coase’s arguments provided an alternative way for 
dealing with the problem of public goods. 
                                                 
16 Lai, L.W.C. “The Property Rights Justifications for Planning and a  
Theory of Zoning”. Progress in Planning. 48, no.3 (1997): 161. 
 
 9 
These famous Coase arguments were critically examined by many 
economists.  Steven N.S. Cheung’s “On the New Institutional Economics” 
(1990 identifies three versions of the Coase Theorem.  Cheung listed their 
relative importance as follows: 
 
I. The delineation of rights is an essential prelude to market 
transaction. 
II. If property rights are clearly delineated with the condition that all 
transaction costs are zero, then resource allocation will be the 
same regardless of who owns the property rights.  
III. Economic efficiency will be satisfied if the above conditions 
(property rights are well delineated and transaction costs are zero) 
exist.  
 
These points first originated in Coase’s paper “Federal 
Communication Commission”. 17   A clear delineation of rights and 
sufficiently low transaction costs are prerequisites to market transactions.  
The Coase Theorem is sometimes referred to as the “Invariance Theorem”.  
The invariance theorem stems from Coase’s paper “The Problem of Social 
Costs,” whose main concern is the constraints, to which the aggregate value 
of the resources involved are subjected, that will be at a maximum.  But 
Cheung commented that Coase’s argument was tautological, since the Pareto 
condition was always satisfied if all the relevant constraints were fully 
                                                 
17 R.H. Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission” The Journal of Law and  
Economics (October 1959): 1-44. 
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specified.  In another words, only when certain relevant constraints are 
omitted does economic inefficiency exist.  
By examining basic economic assumptions, one will find it logically 
impossible to argue that the Pareto condition would not be met if individuals 
in society are subjected to constraints, unless it was conceded that some 
constraints have been omitted.  Besides, in the Coase Theorem, the 
assumption of zero transaction costs includes all conditions of perfect 
competition, and implies the existence of private property rights, which are 
the essence of market transactions.  Daniel Bromley, in his paper “Property 
Regimes in Environmental economics,” argued that the zero transaction cost 
condition could never be satisfied.  In the real world, such transaction costs 
are never zero, so Coase’s solution is not universally applicable to every 
case.  In the example provided by Cheung (1973)18 on the pollination of 
apple flowers by bees and the privatization of ocean fish (also mentioned 
and agreed on by Johnson and Libecap 1982, Anderson 1985 and Lai 1993), 
Cheung’s example already demonstrated the market could tackle the 
problem of externalities.  Besides, the power of the Coase Theorem is that 
                                                 
18 Steven N.S. Cheung, “The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation,” The  
Journal of Law and Economics 16 (April 1973): 11-33. 
 
 11 
the corollary19 (i.e., what would apply to property rights when transaction 
costs are positive?) would be useful for devising the law (Posner 1992)20 and 
planning regulation (Lai 1994a, 1997a).21  
Moreover, Coase did not neglect reality.  He specified the need for 
“Comparative” or “Opportunity cost” modes of thinking.  In “The Problem 
of Social Cost,” he stated that: 
 
A better approach would seen to start our analysis with a situation 
approximating that which actually exists (whether there is any prior 
zoning element), to examine the effects of a proposed (zoning) policy 
change, and to attempt to decide whether the new situation (with the 
inception of zoning) would be, in totally better or worse that the 
original.22 
 
Furthermore, in his book The Firm, the Market and the Law, Coase 
again restated the policy view in a more general form: 
 
                                                 
19 Lai, L.W.C. “The Property Rights Justifications for Planning and a  
Theory of Zoning”. Progress in Planning. 48, no.3 (1997): 161.. 
 
20 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, Boston: Little, Brown and Company,  
1992. 
 
21 Lai, L.W.C. “The Economics of Land Use Zoning: A Literature Review and Analysis  
of the Work of Coase,” Town Planning Review. 65,  no.1(1994a) and  
Lai, L.W.C. “The Property Rights Justifications for Planning and a  
Theory of Zoning”. Progress in Planning. 48, no.3 (1997): 161.. 
 
22 Coase, R.H. “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics  
(October 1960): 43 
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Economic policy consists of choosing those legal rules, procedures, 
and administrative structure which will maximize the value of 
production.23 
 
Therefore, the essence is how institutions fulfill an economics 
function by reducing transaction costs so as to achieve maximum efficiency 
in resource allocation.  Land use planning may be acceptable as the 
alternative to free transactions in the land market.  This type of government 
intervention may be in need where the transaction costs of unregulated land 
market become excessive.  Although it is true that Coase was inclined to 
consider government as less efficient than the market, in some cases, the 
government’s visible hand is beneficial in the cost and benefit analysis.  
Thus, whether land use is justified by the market or by the government 
depends more on the aforesaid analysis rather than on an a priori question. 
 
Market Aspects 
Contradictory to Coase’s idea, which focused on the clear delineation 
of property rights as a prelude to market transactions, an inverse relationship 
is suggested by Andrezej Rapaczynski 24 , in which the development of 
                                                 
23 Coase, R.H. The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
1988. 
 
24 Roaman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzej Rapaczynski Capitalism with a  
comrade’s face: studies in the postcommunist transition. Budapest: Central 
European University Press. 1998. 
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market institutions is often a condition for a practicable private property 
system.  The difference is that Coase’s works explicitly pointed out that 
markets require a clear assignment of initial endowments to most resources 
and well-defined rules of contract.  If the government focuses on enhancing 
a market economy, it should make sure an effective legal system is in place, 
and property rights must be unambiguous, secure, and freely alienable.  
Even if initial entitlements are wrong, they will be corrected by appropriate 
private agreements, if the freedom to contract exists. 
In contrast, Rapaczynski viewed the creation of a system of 
enforceable entitlements as a product of market forces rather than 
governmental fiat. 
Government intervention could be by means of legal regime.  The 
reason is that the market determines the strength of various interest groups 
by formulating their plans of government policies consisting of the 
establishment of property rights, and by modifying the forces of the market 
and the relative strengths of the interest groups.  
The idea of government intervention implies the belief that by simply 
establishing an appropriate legal regime by providing a set of property rights 
is deeply implausible.  However various self-enforcing mechanisms 
ingrained in the incentive structure of spontaneous economic behaviors that 
 14 
are involved in property-related arrangement of an advanced economy, for 
example contracts that are institutions produced by the market, not a set of 
rules that can be laid in advance, provide a more effective and efficient 
solution than predetermined rules and regulations.  In words, the 
establishment of property rights by markets often provides a better solution 
overall. 
Keen debates on the issue of the market verses government regulation 
have materialized since the release of the consultative document 
Comprehensive Review of Town Planning Ordinance in 1991, which had 
this to say: 
The Government must ensure adequate forward planning and 
development control to protect the public interest and to ensure that 
community and social needs are met.  This is not to say that private 
interest should always lose out in the named of public interests.  A 
good planning system is one which provides an appropriate mean[s] 
of balancing community and private interests in development by 
providing suitable safeguards for the rights and interest individual 
parties as well as adequate powers to promote the public interest.25 
 
In the discussion of the term “public interest” in the form of fewer 
private rights and more planning, which is promoted by the Review and the 
assured by Town Planning Bill, Staley (1992, 26  1994 27 ) criticized the 
                                                 
25 Hong Kong Government, Comprehensive Review of Town Planning Ordinance, July  
1991, para.1.3. 
 
26 Staley, Samuel R. Planning, Uncertainty and Economic Development in Hong Kong: A  
Critical Evaluation of the Comprehensive Review of the Town Planning  
 15 
Government’s ignorance of the institutional costs involved in the planning 
control system.  He attempted to evaluate the proposed planning system by 
employing the concept of transaction cost.  As town planners propose 
reforms to local planning permission systems that will set back development 
by forcing landowners to undergo long and doubtful development 
application processes, significant costs will inevitably be incurred through 
delays in processing, appealing, and approving planning applications.  Staley 
supported his analysis with empirical evidence.  He found that a one-month 
delay in the development progress could add at least 1% to the cost of 
development.  The importance of Staley’s work is that it is the first paper 
that contains a critical examination of the local planning system from an 
economic perspective based on the transaction costs paradigm (Coase 
1937,28 1959, 1960). 
Although transaction costs vary according to the specific institutional 
arrangements, Staley used commercial and residential projects with different 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ordinance, 1992 Hong Kong: Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research,  
University of Hong Kong. 
 
27 Staley, Samuel R. Planning Rules and Urban Economics Performance: The Case of  
Hong Kong. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.1994: 154-156. As 
pointed by Lai (1998), Staley is correct but he was wrong not to see the leasehold 
system in HK as a matter of contract. 
 
28 Coase, Ronald H. “The Nature of the firm,” Economica 4 (November 1937): 386-405. 
 
 16 
interest rates for calculation in order to prove his assumption that planning 
reforms will lead to higher transaction costs even in different arrangements.  
Moreover, other authors like Chau, Lai, and Hamer (1996)29 computed the 
cost of delays based on the property floor areas supplied by the local market 
in 1995, which assumed the Bill affected the development projects from that 
year. 
Bristow 30  criticized Staley’s ideas 31  in several aspects.  First, he 
accused Staley of presuming that even in an unregulated land market, 
resource allocation still can function efficiently.  The essence of Bristow’s 
criticism of Staley’s work began with Staley’s characterization of planning 
as “Fundamentally as anti-market process”. Bristow used perfectly 
competitive market ideas to defend the planning system.  He argued that 
“Completely deregulated freely competitive behaviors don’t seem to work 
very satisfactorily,” and that “markets, we must point out, are rarely predict 
                                                 
29 Chan, K.W., Lai, Lawrence L.W.C., and Hamer, A.M., “An Economic Analysis of the  
1996 Town Planning Bill,” Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, 
Department of Real Estate and Construction, University of Hong Kong, 1996. 
 
30 Bristow, M. Roger, “In Defence of Planning - A Commentary on Staley,” Planning  
and Development 11, no. 1 (1995): 24-26. 
 
31 Staley, Samuel R. Planning, Uncertainty and Economic Development in Hong Kong: A  
Critical Evaluation of the Comprehensive Review of the Town Planning 
Ordinance, 1992 Hong Kong: Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research, 
University of Hong Kong. 
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in reality”32.  Bristow derided the naïve concept of the existence of perfectly 
competitive markets in the real world.  He also criticized the idea that 
economic consideration is the only theme in planning because an “over-
dependence on single themes or single methodologies has always proved to 
be both dangerous and unproductive in land-use planning…and what land-
use planning is about is not just the working of property markets.”  Bristow 
then continued to discuss the typical justifications for planning in relation to 
social values, for example the allocation of limited resources to fulfill 
choices and achieve desired lifestyles. 
Bristow’s main point was that the proposed changes to the Town 
Planning Ordinance will result in higher transaction costs if the proposals in 
the Comprehensive Review were implemented. 
In response to Bristow’s criticism, Staley 33  explicitly said that 
planning overrides markets and statutory plans are fundamentally anti-
market in nature due to their designs and implementations.  As an objection 
to Bristow’s claim that markets only take economic considerations into 
account, Staley argued that markets in fact integrate a whole collection of 
social and individual prospective that reflect the behaviors of individuals.  
                                                 
32 Bristow, M. Roger, “In Defence of Planning - A Commentary on Staley,” Planning  
and Development 11, no. 1 (1995): 24-26. 
 
33 Staley, Samuel R. Planning Rules and Urban Economics Performance: The Case of  
Hong Kong. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.1994: 154-156. 
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As markets are competitive in nature, then people will allocate resources 
effectively. Maximizing the behavior of consumers and producers will 
reveal their selfish character in a reasonably unfettered market with their 
property rights protected.  On the other hand, ignoring the economic impacts 
of planning on urban development by private developers could undermine a 
town’s development potential.  Hence, protecting property rights by 
providing a political and social stable climate for investment in the property 
market should be among the most important functions of any government. 
Law Aspects 
Posner is famous for his contribution to the economic theorization of 
law, which the work of Coase has stimulated in his studies of the 
relationship between law and economics. 
Posner has contributed much to the relationship between law and 
economics.  He compared the method of legal and market allocations in his 
book cHis view was that the market should normally be the one that decides 
resource allocation, and the legal system should be of a low priority.  When 
the costs of a market’s determination exceed those of a legal determination, 
then the decision should be given to the legal system in that situation.  
Posner believed that in terms of resource competition, the market is a more 
efficient mechanism than the law.  The reason behind this is that legislative 
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allocations are far less efficient in ascertaining preferences or relative values.  
As people have to back up their value assertions with some equivalent 
sacrifice in a capitalist society, their willingness to pay imparts a greater 
credibility than forensic energy to a claim of superior value.  
Posner also argued in his book Economic Analysis of law (1992) that 
when the costs of market determination exceed those of legal determination 
in order to maximize social wealth, resource allocation should be left to a 
court decision; the court should apply an economic analysis of law.  It 
should make its decision in such a way as to reduce transaction costs, and 
hence maximize social wealth.  This hit the fundamental concept of Coase’s 
transaction cost approach, which suggests that a choice of resource 
allocation should reduce transaction costs involved to a minimum.   
Friedman 34  said “The economic analysis of law” involved four 
enterprises.  First, using economics predicts the effects of the legal rules; 
second, using economics determines what legal rules are economically 
efficient with the intention of recommending what the legal rules ought to be; 
and last, using economics predicts what the legal rules will be, and the least 
                                                 
34 Frideman, D. “Law and Economics”” in Eatwell, John and Milgate, Murray and  
Newman, Peter ed. New Palgrave:A Dictionary of Economics 3, Lodan: 
Macmillan, (1987): 144-148. 
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controversial use of economic analysis predicts the effect of alternative legal 
rules. 
In the actual operation of law, it is amenable to economic analysis.  
Regarding procedural law, civil law and criminal law could demonstrate this 
idea.  For civil law, the court will reimburse costs if a defendant has paid the 
court a sum, and if a plaintiff has done something to mitigate his loss or 
committed contributory.  On the other hand, in criminal law, the court has 
flexible sentencing power.  It will impose punishment on those who are 
guilty.  The component of law could be viewed in two parts.  One is a black 
and white written law and the other is the rule of law under the common law 
system.  The aim of law could be viewed in two ways.  First, it is also used 
to achieve Pigou’s market failure concept.  The legislation passed by the 
government (e.g. planning law) could be treated as using the law to deal with 
both positive and negative externalities arousing from land issues. 
Conversely, in terms of Coase’s wording, the law could help delineate 
property rights.  Thus, each individual will know his/her rights and liabilities.  
In addition, the law defines the rule of competition for a given resource, 
which minimizes transaction costs and reduces rent dissipation.  Besides, it 
protects private property rights by imposing punishment on the guilty or 
rewarding the sufferer.  For instance, in business law, it protects private 
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property rights with contracts made between two or more parties, so it is 
important for people to choose private contracts to internalize costs.  
Court judgment also plays an important role in helping to solve 
conflicts in private contracts, or imposing penalties on those who breach the 
law.  The importance of the court is that it helps provide consistent 
judgments and clarifies ambiguous law terms.  This lets the public know the 
boundary of legislations and individual rights and liabilities in a certain 
society.  Some judges will invoke precedented cases to influence their 
decisions on future cases.  Thus, judges must consider the probable impact 
of alternative rulings for cases involving people engaged in similar activities.  
In later cases, when judges are applying statutes, they will consider the terms 
of the original deal between the enacting legislature and the beneficiaries of 
the legislation.  Substantive law is formed by previous judgments, and the 
rules of law will tend to be consistent with the dictates of efficiency.  
The law, as a system, is best explained as maximizing the wealth of a 
society.  The economic analysis of law can be viewed as either an attempt to 
learn what should be, or as an attempt to explain what is and predict what 
will be. 
Other than the argument of Posner, in which an analysis of what legal 
rules are efficient provides a reason for what legal rules will come out, and 
 22 
the examination of what legal rules are present provides an analysis of 
theories on what legal rules are efficient.  There is another approach 
associated with public choice theory.  It views administrative, legislative, 
and common law as outcomes of a political market.  The Marxist argument 
argues that the fundamental social and economic institutions of capitalist 
society systematically promote the interests of those who control society’s 
productive capital over the rest of society.  Interest groups seek private 
objectives by governmental means.  In order to pass the laws they favor, 
such groups will consider the value of the law to themselves, and will 
calculate the amount they are willing to spend.  A group’s ability to solve 
social problems depends on the ability35 and willingness of its members to 
contribute to its political activities.  Hence, inefficient laws exist, as they 
will not accurately represent the value of the law to those affected.  
Inefficient laws will be passed that will injure the losers more than they 
benefit the winners.  The outcome is that a group will tend to be favored by 
the law at the expense of dispersed interests, given that the former will be 
better able to raise money from their members to enact the laws they want.  
                                                 
35 Lai, L.W.C. and Chan, Pearl Yik-Long “The Formation of Owners’ Corporations in  
Hong Kong’s Private Housing Estates: A Probit Evaluation of Mancur Olson’s 
Group Theory”, Property Management 22, no. 1 (2004): 55-68. 
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The use of economic analysis to determine what the law ought to be 
begins with a sole purpose, that is, a law should promote economic 
efficiency.  While maximizing economic efficiency may not be the only 
purpose, it is an important one in economic theory.  For instance, an 
improvement in efficiency may be something that courts can achieve, 
whereas redistribution may not achieve. 
Private Property Rights Aspects36 
 The British planning system is the foundation of Hong Kong’s 
planning system.  It has no zoning in the sense that all forms of development 
accept a few exempted classes of use within the Council District, while other 
special areas, for instance, the National Park in England, which are indeed 
“super zones”37, must go through the planning application procedure.  The 
Council, which is filled by politicians, may refuse or approve applications 
with or without planning conditions.  This discretionary power is only 
constrained by the procedural law of nature justice.  As stated by Mills 
(1989), rent seeking activities exist, as these activities are case-by-case 
depending on their land proposal merits and demerits.  Gifford (1987) 
further identified the presence of rent seeking activities.  They could be 
                                                 
36 Lai, L.W.C. Zoning and property rights : a Hong Kong case study Hong Kong : Hong  
Kong University Press, 1996. 
 
37 Ibid. 
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either ex-post or ex-ante.  The former is one through which politicians invest 
real resources in an attempt to secure rents due to regulation, while the latter 
is one through which developers invest real resources in an attempt to 
capture a larger share of the rent for themselves.     
While the government owns the land, it may have a legal obligation to 
supervise and define broadly the conceived uses of it in the public interest.  
Private property rights eventually supersede communal property rights in 
order to restrain rent dissipation and reduce the transaction costs of the land 
market through regularizing land boundaries.  Such controls range from 
contractual obligations to statutory obligations.  On one hand, developers 
have contracts with the government.  Under the full knowledge of the 
restrictions on development, developers pay the maximum they are able to 
afford, which reflects the value of the land in which the maximum capacity 
permitted will be developed.  In a stable free market, developers view the 
sale of the leases as the granting of full permission to develop the land, and 
therefore they bid on these leases in public auctions or submit tender sums 
accordingly. 
This situation will only happen under the condition in which all 
parties involved in a contract, including the government, are respected.  
Therefore, the existence of this implicit contract has been instrumental in 
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reducing uncertainty within property markets, and allows land markets to 
work efficiently and effectively to meet the changing demands of consumers 
and producers in the local economy. 
In such a way, any land use rights of lessees, including a change of 
land use and other building constraints like height, which are defined in 
government leases, are then effectively restrained by planners.  
Lai (1994a, 1997a) identified four areas of particular significance: 
 
I. The unclear delineation of statutory development rights and public 
interference with private decisions regarding putting land to its 
most valuable use, as exercised through the planning application 
and planning enforcement procedures; 
II. taxation on the right to use land for a given purpose, notably non-
compensated statutory down zoning, including the lowering of 
pre-existing plot ratios; 
III. a restriction on the right to alter the boundaries of a development, 
notably the requirement of a joint development of land belonging 
to different proprietors and planning applications (which in turn 
means public interference with private decisions regarding putting 
land to its most valuable use) under the “Comprehensive 
Development Area” concept in the statutory town plans; and 
IV. the taking of land for public or private purposes. 
 
In the above areas, a rough discussion of how a zoning system 
restricts private property rights was shown.  In a future chapter, how it 
applies to Hong Kong will be further discussed.  
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Methodology 
In this study, the reasons of dismissing or allowing planning appeals 
will be evaluated for efficiency from the property rights perspective.  
Seventeen appeal cases from 2002 to 2004 will be analyzed.  The Appeal 
Board’s attitude towards the market will be discovered from these cases and 
summarized. 
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CHAPTER 2 
APPROACH TO STUDY PLANNING APPEAL ISSUES 
 
 The objective of the literature review in this dissertation is to establish 
a framework for analyzing planning applications and planning appeal cases 
in Hong Kong in terms of private property rights.  In order to achieve this 
purpose, the approaches to studying planning appeals will be identified and 
discussed.  
 
Approaches to Writing Planning Appeals 
Banks (1994)38 discussed planning appeal issues by going into detail 
the planning appeal procedures, like how to appeal, the appeal strategy, and 
the effect of quashing the decision.  Appeal cases were cited across the book 
to illustrate the planning appeal procedure in deep detail, like the term 
“material consideration,” which is vital for evaluating the strength of a case.  
But the problem is that Banks focused much more on the procedures of 
planning appeals and works in a practical approach.  It didn’t do much to 
analyze the effects of having such procedures in an academic approach.  
Platt (2004)39 also had similar approach for demonstrating planning appeal 
                                                 
38 See Banks, Sandra. Practical planning: Appeals and inquires. London: Longman, 1994. 
 
39 See Platt, Rutherford H. Land use and society: geography, law, and public policy.  
Washington: Island Press, 2004. 
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issues.  In his book, four issues were addressed.  At first, it reviewed the 
current status of land use in the US, the background on the fields of 
geography and law, their interaction with land use planning and management, 
and mentioned the evolution of planning law in the US.  Moreover, it 
revisited some early English History, beginning with feudalism and 
summarizing the legal and geographic nature of property ownership and 
local governments in the US.  In addition, it focused on techniques and 
experiences with urban planning and redevelopment, reviewed the 
constitutional basis for that planning institution and the comparable uses of 
the regulatory power that had been made.  Last, it examined recent 
experiences in land use management at higher levels of government in the 
US, such as case studies of the Pinelands Commission in New Jersey and the 
Appalachian Regional Commission.  In order to deal with different aspects 
in the books, a number of legal cases in the US over the past century were 
cited across the book for illustrating the land policies of the government 
from the viewpoint of the courts for granting planning permissions and their 
effects on future cases.  According to Banks (1994),40 the trend of the courts’ 
decisions could not be seen.  In addition, the appeal procedures' strengths 
and weaknesses were not easily understood. 
                                                 
40 See Banks, Sandra. Practical planning: Appeals and inquires. London: Longman, 1994. 
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Apart from the appeal cases, which were sorted into different concepts 
by Skouras (1998),41 Skouras started with the brief history of taking clauses 
and modern criteria.  The Supreme Court’s decisions were reviewed, with 
the major juridical developments being analyzed in various theoretical 
approaches.  The economic dimension to land use was finally examined in 
the book.  Skouras criticized the Court’s decisions mainly because of his 
inconsistent judgments and its ad hoc solutions to the land compensation 
issue.  The court cases were examined by way separating the law cases into 
two periods, pre-Industrial Revolution and post-Industrial Revolution.  Thus, 
the trend of the court decisions could be followed, and it helped analyze 
their problems.  However, the court cases were not discussed in depth, but 
only used to illustrate the trend of court decisions and their effects.  
Selmi (1999) 42  objected to studying appeal cases.  Although the 
contents of the book are similar to those found in Skouras, in which he 
introduced land use controls, the land use regulatory tools of the US 
government, and their limitations, as well as discussing in depth how land 
use controls effectuate governmental policy objectives, their approaches 
                                                 
41 See Skouras, George. Takings law and the Supreme Court: judicial oversight of the  
regulatory state's acquisition, use, and control of private property. New York: P. 
Lang, 1998. 
 
42 Selmi, Daniel P. Land Use Regulation Cases and Materials. Gaithersburg: Aspen Law  
& Business. 1999. 
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were different.  The recent appeal cases were cited with notes and comments 
thoroughly illustrating each topic in order to understand the court's point of 
view on each issue.  The reason behind this is that the new cases, rather than 
the old ones, are more powerful for illustrating the latest trend of court 
decisions.  But Selmi’s approach still faces some problems.  Each topic only 
mentions one court case, and does not show if the points of view were 
universally applied.  Besides, the trend of the court decisions was not clear.  
Stubbs (2001)43 conducted an in-depth study to solve the problems of 
Selmi (1999). 44   In his study, he examined the reasoning submitted by 
inspectors when deciding cost applications, and sought to understand the 
relationship between officers' recommendations and reversals of such 
decisions by council members.  Five hundred cost decision letters were 
analyzed to see which applications were allowed/refused and the grounds for 
seeking costs.  However, Stubb’s approach also encountered some 
difficulties.  Without knowing the details of each case, the researcher will 
not know the underlining reasons for granting or rejecting the costs.  
                                                 
43 See Michael Stubbs. “Councilors and Costs: The Vulnerability of Member-led  
Planning Refusals to and Award of Costs at Planning Appeal in England and 
Wales,” Planning Practice & Research 16, no.2 (2001): 121-144. 
 
44 See Selmi, Daniel P. Land Use Regulation Cases and Materials. Gaithersburg: Aspen  
Law & Business, 1999. 
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Lai (2004)45 tried a different approach to examine planning appeal 
cases.  He gave an outline of the context and procedures of town planning at 
the beginning of his book.  Then he analyzed the statistics of planning 
applications from 11 zones from 1978 to 1998 and clarified the reasons used 
by the Town Planning Board for rejecting planning applications.  
Furthermore, Lai’s work featured detailed appendices providing 
fundamental statistical information on both aggregate and non-aggregate 
development applications. 46   The chance of success of applications for 
specific uses, locations, or sizes of development on a zone-by-zone basis in 
light of refutable hypotheses could be better understood.  This type of 
research approach was also a problem for Stubbs.47   In order to gain a 
complete understanding of the appeal cases issues, Lai (2003)48 remedied the 
                                                 
45 Lai, L.W.C. and Fong, K. Town Planning Practice: Context, Procedures and Statistics  
for Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000.  Also see Lai, 
L.W.C., Ho, Daniel Chi-wing, and Leung, Hing-fung. Change in Use of Land: A 
Practical Guide to Development in Hong Kong. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2004). 
 
46 Ibid. 
 
47 See Michael Stubbs. “Councilors and Costs: The Vulnerability of Member-led  
Planning Refusals to and Award of Costs at Planning Appeal in England and 
Wales,” Planning Practice & Research 16, no.2 (2001): 121-144. 
 
48 See Lai, L.W.C., Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal  
Decisions. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999 and also Lai, Town  
Planning in Hong Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decision 1997-2001 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003). 
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problems.  In his book, he studied 50 planning appeal cases49 decided by the 
Town Planning Appeal Board up to October 1997.  Lai first summarized the 
rules revealed in the 50 cases.  Then for every decided case, he provided a 
chronological presentation of key facts, arguments involved, decisions made 
and reasons for them, and indicated the rules laid down.  This helped give a 
clearer picture of all cases and allowed one to better understand the decision 
making trends of the Town Planning Appeal Board. 
In addition, Lai commented on the facts and decisions, questions for 
discussion, and relevant cases and literature for further research.  The 
analysis approach is based on a textual interpretation of the materials 
reported in appeal decisions from the stance of environmental planning, law, 
and economics.  This is important, as there are few systematic publications 
on statutory planning in Hong Kong.  What’s more, cases are analyzed from 
different points of view, including law, planning, and valuation, which have 
great implications on land values and valuation procedures.  There are, 
altogether, 69 cases covered by Lai, of which 50 cases are from his 1999 
work and 19 cases from his 2003 work.50  Lai also cited an appeal case from 
                                                 
49 All the planning appeal cases available after the introduction of the Town Planning  
(Amendment) Ordinance in November 1991 to October 1997. 
 
50 Lai, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decisions. Hong  
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1991, 51  which articulated planning law points, policies, and substantive 
arguments raised by authorities in the field, as well as provided insight into 
the development of planning appeal case decisions.  In Lai‘s 2003 work, he 
examined 18 planning appeal cases decided by the Town Planning Appeal 
Board.52  The cases reported were cross-referenced with each other and with 
Lai which the reported cases are in relevant areas.  From Lai’s books, the 
following statistic record could be concluded.  The Town Planning Appeal 
Board (hereafter referred to as the Appeal Board) tends to dismiss an appeal.  
Of the 69 appeal cases, only seven cases were allowed to proceed.  From 
1990 to 2000, the failure rate of reported cases for the years 1992, 1993, 
1995, 1998, and 2000 was 100%.  In addition, 1993 saw a record 11 cases 
dismissed.  Compared to this high failure rate, the highest success rate was 
only 40% in 1994, in which four cases out of ten were approved.  The other 
three successful cases came in 1996, 1997, and 1999, which had success 
rates of 11%, 25%, and 20%, respectively.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999 and also Lai, Town Planning in Hong 
Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decision 1997-2001. (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2003). 
 
51 Lai, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decisions. Hong  
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999. 
 
52 Lai, Town Planning in Hong Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decision 1997-2001.  
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003). 
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The following graph shows the success and failure rates of reported 
cases for the  years 1990 to 2000. 
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from 1991 to 2001 
 
The successful cases were the Yiu Cho Investment case, Naturaluck 
case, Henderson case, So Cho Cheung case, Yolanda Fan case, Rightlane 
Investment case, and Kam To Sauna case.  The following table shows some 
details of the successful cases. 
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TABLE 1 
DETAILS OF THE SUCCESSFUL CASES 
(FROM 1991 TO 2001) 
 
Case Name Case number 
Approval 
Date 
Appeal Board 
chaired by Case details 
Yiu Cho 
Investment 
case 
14/93 8 April 1994 
Mr. Justice 
Henry Litton, 
OBE 
An application for an office 
development in a Residential 
Group (A) Zone on Leighton 
Road 
Naturaluck 
case 16/93 
21 April 
1994 
Mr. Robert 
Tang, QC. 
An application for 572m2 
petrol filling station in the 
New Territories 
Henderson 
case 13/93 
26 August 
1994 
Mr. Robert 
Tang, Q.C. 
An application for a 98.3 ha 
residential golf course/nature 
reserve project near the Mai 
Po Marshes, which is a 
designated Ramsar site.  This 
was an important appeal case 
of legal and planning 
significance 
So Cho 
Cheung case 2/94 
28 
November 
1994 
Mr. Justice 
Henry Litton, 
OBE 
An application for operating a 
fast food shop in a unit in Fo 
Tan, Shatin.  Permission with 
condition would expire on 31 
December 1997 
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TABLE 1: CONTINUED 
DETAILS OF THE SUCCESSFUL CASES 
(1991 TO 2001) 
 
Yolanda Fan case 1/96 30 August 1996 
Mr. Robert 
Tang, Q.C. 
An application for 
using a flat as a 
temple.  A site visit 
was done by a 
member of Appeal 
Board upon the 
request of the 
involved parties 
before a decision 
was made. 
 
Rightlane 
Investment case 12/96 1 July 1997 
Mr. Robert 
Tang, S.C. 
An application for a 
minor relaxation of 
the plot ratio for a 
Rural Building Lot 
on Headland Road 
Kam To Sauna 
case 01/98 30 July 1999 
Mr. Robert 
TangS.C. 
An application for a 
sauna bath in a 
commercial 
residential block in 
the Sham Shui Po 
District, Kowloon 
 37 
In Lai’s works, the following trend is also evident.  Most of the appeal 
cases were ruled on by Mr. Justice Henry Litton, OBE, as Chairman of the 
Panel, and Mr. Robert C. Tang, QC, JP, as Chairman of the Panel.  However, 
since the case from 08/95, there have been no further reported cases judged 
by a panel chaired by the former panel.  More recently, Mr. Ronny F.H. 
Wong, SC, ruled on six cases, while Hon. Justice G. Lugar-Mawson ruled on 
eight cases.  All of these cases were dismissed and represented a 100% 
failure rate.  The appeal cases ruled under Mr. Robert Tang, SC. were the 
most favorable to appellants; five out of 29 cases presented before him were 
allowed, which was nearly a 17% success rate.  Altogether, Mr. Justice 
Litton and Mr. Tang ruled on 23 appeal cases, and all except two were 
dismissed, which gave their appellants a combined success rate of 8.7%, 
second only behind Mr. Robert Tang, SC.   
Of all the major reasons for the appellants’ rejections, “against 
planning intention” or “against planning objective” were frequently implied 
or expressed by the Appeal Board for dismissing appeal cases.  Thirty-two 
out of 69 cases that were “against planning intention” were expressly used to 
reject planning appeals, while ten out of 69 cases were implied for rejecting 
appeals.  Altogether, 42 cases were labeled “against planning intention” as 
the reason for rejection out of 62 dismissed cases, and only five cases were 
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denied this reason for rejecting appeals.  The proportion of this reason for 
dismissing appeal cases was 67.7%.  In addition, three successful cases (the 
Henderson case, Naturaluck case, and So Cho Cheung case) were approved 
as a consequence of rejecting the “against planning intention” reason given 
by the Planning Board, whilst four successful cases did not take this reason 
into account.  It seems to have been very important for appellants to not have 
this reason in order to get approval.  
The most interesting and significant of “planning intention” was 
discovered in Lai’s book.  There can be a departure from planning intention 
if there is a strong justification53.  This rule was stated in the Ingenuity 
Limited case, Wah Yuen Metal Godown case, Mr. Yau X case, and Mr. 
Tsang X case.  
The location of planning intention is also very crucial, but was 
criticized by Lai, as it helps the Appeal Board judge whether a case is 
against planning intention or not.  Usually, the planning intention is located 
in the explanatory statements of the Outline Zoning Plan (OZP) or other 
statutory plans.  Thirty-two cases were contained therein.  However, some of 
the planning intentions were located in the administrative plan, which should 
                                                 
53 The problem of the “departure”, see last chapter (Lai, L.W.C. “Town Planning in Hong  
Kong: A Review of Planning Appeal Decision 1997-2001. Hong Kong: Hong  
Kong University Press, 2003.) 
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not have been taken into account for making judgments.  Altogether, they 
helped identify 13 cases of planning intention.  
Apart from using “against planning intention” to dismiss appeals, the 
Appeal Board usually uses a zero nuisance rule to reject cases (See the Ultra 
Force and Kingspeed Engineering Company cases), except for a few cases 
(usually the allowed cases like the Yiu Cho Investment and Yolanda Fan 
cases) that were discovered by Lai.  The Appeal Board usually gives reasons 
like an incompatibility with neighboring development (shown in 14 cases), 
Traffic/ Access Problems (shown in 20 cases), and an adverse impact on 
development and/or Pollution (shown in ten cases).  
Overall, the Appeal Board shows its hostility to market and 
development attitudes by giving the following reasons for rejection: “no 
public interest” (illustrated in four cases), “no planning and environmental 
gain” (illustrated in three cases), “no market use applied” (illustrated in three 
cases), “alternative supply available nearby” (illustrated in seven cases), and 
even “ad hoc development preempting future plans” (illustrated in 11 cases).   
Aside from Lai’s research, Yeung (1995)54 tried to focus on using 
property rights aspects to analyze the appeal cases in Hong Kong in his 
dissertation.  Six appeal cases were cited for evaluation.  To fulfill this 
                                                 
54 Yeung Ka Hong. “Economic Analysis of Planning Appeal System in Hong Kong.”  
B.Sc. diss., The University of Hong Kong, 1995. 
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purpose, Yeung performed literature reviews on two economic schools of 
thought, and analyzed how property rights issues are viewed by the Appeal 
Board.  Choi (2002)55 followed a similar approach.  In this dissertation, only 
five appeal cases were cited for evaluation.  
Pang’s (2001) 56  dissertation examined planning appeals and the 
planning system by looking at the uncertainty of these decisions.  Moreover, 
Pang addressed the problems arising from uncertainties in appeal cases and 
recommendations.  Seven appeal cases and one court case were cited for 
evaluation, which followed Lai’s approach.  
                                                 
55 Choi Kit-Man. “Planning Appeal Decisions Decided in 200-2001: A Comparative  
Textual Study and an Economic analysis.” B.Sc. diss., The University of Hong 
Kong, 2002. 
 
56 Pang Kwok Shun. “Uncertainty in Town Planning Application System in Hong Kong:  
a Review of Planning Appeal Decisions 1996-2000.” B.Sc. diss., The University 
of Hong Kong, 2001. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF THE PLANNING APPEAL SYSTEM 
  
For the purpose of setting the context of Appeal Board decisions, this 
chapter outlines the town planning system in Hong Kong.  
 
Town Planning in Hong Kong 
Development and the use of land in Hong Kong are governed by the 
Town Planning Ordinance. 57   The purpose of planning legislation is to 
promote the “health, safety and convenience and general welfare for the 
community,” which is stated in the Preamble of the Town Planning 
Ordinance.  Statutory town planning in Hong Kong has been carried out 
through two pieces of legislation, the Town Planning Ordinance of 1939 and 
the Country and Marine Parks Ordinance.  Each ordinance sets its own 
planning board.  Seventy percent of the land in the territory is under the 
control of the Country Parks Board, while the Town Planning Board 
oversees all land outside the country parks.  Two major revisions between 
1939 and the present came in 1974 and 1991.58  The former legislates for the 
                                                 
57 Town Planning Ordinance, Chapter 131, Laws of Hong Kong. 
 
58 Extension of planning controls in the New Territories in 1991, which control unwanted  
conversions of agricultural land. Also see Lai, L. W. C. and Fong, K. Town  
Planning Practice: Context, Procedures and Statistics for Hong Kong. Hong  
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000 and  
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existing zoning procedures, which allow the introduction of limited planning 
permissions for the first time.  The latter extends power to the planning 
controls in the New Territories, which cover unwanted conversions of 
agricultural land that resulted from the immediate legislative and planning 
concerns of the government.  These statutory plans include the Interim 
Development Permission (IDPA) Plan, Development Permission Area (DPA) 
Plan, and, more commonly, the Outline Zoning Plan (OZP). 
Furthermore, the Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance of 1991 
initiated the planning appeal mechanism operation, which provides planning 
application and review procedures.  An independent body, the Town 
Planning Appeal Board has been set up to hear appeals against the decisions 
of the Town Planning Board. 
Since the Planning Department was established in 1990, a Town 
Planning (Amendment) Ordinance (Chapter 131) was announced for public 
consultation in July 1996.59  But beforehand, a review was set up in 1992-
1993 for a special committee to consider the special issues of compensation 
and betterment within the Hong Kong planning system, and it recommended 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lai, L. W. C., Ho, Daniel Chi-wing and Leung, Hing-fung. Change in Use of  
Land: A Practical Guide to Development in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong  
University Press, 2004. 
 
59 Hong Kong Government Planning, Environment and Lands Branch. Consultation  
Paper on the Town Planning Bill. Hong Kong: Government Printer, July 1996. 
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the continuation of the status quo in these contentious areas of public policy.  
The consultation that began in 1996 advanced to the last stage of this lengthy 
process by preparing the Blue Bill in January 2000.  
The Town Planning Ordinance has never attempted to develop a 
detailed set of regulations.  Consequently, notes to the plans prepared by 
Town Planning Board wordings in administrative documents, such as the 
Town Planning Board Guidelines (prepared by the Town Planning Board), 
explanatory statements attached to the plans (prepared by the Planning 
Department), and the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines 
(HKPSG), which are issued by the government, have become very important, 
as they provide almost all technical matters regarding the interpretation of 
statutory town plans for helping in the judgments of planning applications 
and planning appeal cases.  Lai (1999) shared a similar view: 
 
The Town Planning Bill 1996 did not bother itself with the question of 
putting technical planning matters on an unambiguous statutory basis 
or step up the scientific nature of planning as a professional endeavor.  
This state of affairs shapes the way in which decisions are made by 
the Town Planning Board by exercising its discretionary power. (p.2 ) 
 
Land is an extremely scarce resource and a major source of 
government revenue in Hong Kong, so a need to strike a balance in the 
utilization of this limited resource to meet the competing needs and demands 
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of society, like those of housing, commerce, industry, transport, recreation, 
etc.  Compromise is essential for balancing the private and social 
needs/wants of society, as stated in Article 6 of the Basic Law, which 
expressly protects private property.  Although private property rights are 
expressed clearly in the Basic Law in accordance with the “Sino-British 
Agreement” in 1984, Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance enforcers 
have generally ignored the implications of the Agreement and the Basic Law.  
Common law rights defenders affirmed this in the Melhado case, which did 
not pay any compensation, as stipulated by its very “planning enforcement” 
provisions.  The aim for these two purposes was achieved through the 
implementation of various types of town plans; thus, an undertaking of 
planning studies and a formulation of planning standards and guidelines are 
essential for planning control achievement.  
In interpreting statutory town plans, one may have to draw inference 
from the “Notes” to the plans prepared by the Town Planning Board, 
expressions in administrative documents (such as those from the Town 
Planning Board), explanatory statements attached to the plans prepared by 
the Planning Department, and the HKPSG issued by the Government (Lai 
1999: p.2).  The interpretation of town plans by the Board varies from case 
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to case by shifting between statutory plans and administrative plans.  This 
uncertainty has raised the attention of researchers and interest groups.  
Since town planning strikes a balance between private and social 
interests, the implementation of plans will definitely affect private property 
rights.  Hence, interest groups, including developers and proprietors and 
certain social interest groups, tend to focus on the activities of the Town 
Planning Board because it deals with land of great economic value that is 
either urbanized or in the process of urbanization.  The power of the Town 
Planning Board is increasing, and along with it its influence.  Many people 
are concerned with the urban environment, in addition to the impact of the 
proliferation of urban activities on the urban fringes, which are regarded as 
having significant visual, ecological, or sentimental values, real or imaginary. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 In this chapter, appeal cases are reviewed in order to find out the 
attitude of Appeal Board towards market. Appeal Board’s comments are 
citied across this chapter. The reasons for rejection are grouped for 
independent analyzing. They are bad precedent, not in line with planning 
intention, presumption in favour of development and zero nuisance.   
REVIEWS OF PLANNING APPEALS 1991-2004 
Before the establishment of the Town Planning Appeal Board in 
November 1991, any appeal against the planning review of an application 
under S.17(1) of the Town Planning Ordinance was made to the Governor in 
Council by way of petition.  Few appeal petitions were made after the 
petition system was set up in 1974. 
The establishment of the Appeal Board changed the situation 
significantly.  The number of appeal cases increased.  After the usual 
rejection of a planning application by the Town Planning Board, a lot of 
reviews were made, but only some of them were heard by the Appeal Board.  
Why so many cases were not brought to the attention of the Appeal Board 
could be summed up by a few reasons.  For instance, some appellants 
withdrew their appeals because they desired to change their plans, while 
some other applications were considered invalid.  
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Lai (1999, 2003) performed a review of town planning appeal cases 
raised when an applicant is aggrieved by the decision of S.17(1) after a 
planning appeals review hearing affirming the rejection of his/her S.16 
application.  He gave a detailed analysis of 69 cases heard and decided upon 
between November 1991 and June 2002.  In addition, Choi (2002) reviewed 
another five appeal cases. 
The attitude of the Town Planning Appeal Board towards the market 
was shown in Lai’s 1999 and 2003 analyses, which formed a fundamental 
framework for analyzing recent appeal cases in a future chapter.  Besides, in 
order to sum up and provide an overall picture of the 17 appeal cases from 
2002 to 2004, each individual appeal case will be analyzed by its own 
characteristic.  Individual examinations with comments are attached in the 
appendix.  
Of the 17 appeal cases, four concerned small house applications, 
seven were associated with open storage uses, three referred to warehouse 
and shop uses, two referred to container storage and container vehicle 
parking uses, and one was linked to other uses.  The following table shows 
the distribution of the requested uses of these appeal cases. 
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TABLE 2 
APPLIED USAGE OF 17 APPEALS 
  
Appeal Case Name Open Storage 
Small House 
Development Other Uses 
Cheng Cheung Fai case   Barber Shop 
Hop Shing case X   
Union Kind, Ltd. Case X  Office Use 
Choi Fung Keung case  X  
Kin Si Construction case X   
Chow Ching Yee case  X  
Thai and Metal Trading case X   
Two Mr. Yaus case  X  
Wong Wing Sing case   Shop Electrical Appliance 
Tang Fook Cheung case   Warehouse 
C&P Holdings case X   
Lau Sui Kit case  X  
Wong Chuen Yuen case   
Container 
Trailer/Tractor 
Park 
Kwan Tak Wah case X   
Chuen Kee Motor Engineering 
case   
Canteen/Car 
Washing Area 
Tang Koon Yau case X   
Sun Hung Kai case   
Container 
Storage/Parking 
of Container 
Vehicles 
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Not in line with planning intention 
The reason for rejection, “not in line with planning intention,” is often 
strongly expressed by the Appeal Board as per its perception of the market 
as an inevitable contrast to planning or the environment, even if the 
legislative intention is quite clear.  A sign of this was first discovered in the 
decision on the OTB case.  In that case, the Appeal Board stated that 
permitting the application would set a bad precedent and amount to 
“throwing planning out of the window.”60  Chan (1998)61 agreed with this, 
and commented that in recent years, there has been a trend of adopting a 
reason for being “not in line with the planning intention” to reject planning 
application for uses that have not been planned for.  This reason was 
logically criticized by Lai (1999: p.16-18).  
First, the entry of a use in Column 2 implies that the use is compatible 
with the adjoining zones to that zone.  Thus, such a use must be consistent 
with the “planning intention”.  The reason, “not in line with planning 
intention” could not be established.  The Naturaluck case supported this 
argument by stating that the entry of a use in Column 2 of a zone implies 
                                                 
60 Cited from the Appeal Board’s comments when it decided on some appeal cases. 
 
61 Andrew P.C. Chan, “The Town Planning Appeal Board in Hong Kong - an Historical  
Perspective,” Planning and Development 15, (no.2, 1998): 34-35. 
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that this use is compatible with the adjoining zones.  However, this rule is 
rarely used, and usually ignored in cases such as that of Jetway Civil. 
Some have argued that this reason is established, as there is a 
departure from planning intention.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the original legislative intention of the planning permission and appeal 
system from its historical perspective was to allow a reasonable departure 
from town plans.  If there is a strong justification, then there is a possibility 
that the Town Planning Board will qualify its reason of planning intention 
by referencing a departure from such an intention.  The Town Planning 
Board seems to promote the concept of planning intention loosely, and 
demonstrates a degree of flexibility to meet the planning objective (see the 
Ingenuity Limited case).  However, planning intention departed also 
produced another problem.  This belief was criticized by Lai (1999, 2003):  
 
The idea of allowing a departure from the “intention” betrays the fact 
that such an intention has seldom been unambiguously or legitimately, 
spelled out in a statutory document or any administrative document, 
including the Explanatory Statement Lai (1999: p.20-24, 2003: p. 20-
26). 
 
As a matter of law, this uncertainty should not happen.  The rationale 
behind it is that if the intention behind the plan is definitive, then the zoning 
objective is wrong, as there cannot be any departure from it.  The town 
Planning Board and Appeal Board should not make their own decisions 
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outside the scope of the plan.  The power to change the law should lie with 
the Legislative Council, while the Town Planning Board should be limited to 
changing plans.  
Beyond that, the unclear location of planning intention also results in 
a troubled consequence.  Planning intention is never expressed in lengthy 
paragraphs in explanatory statements for statutory plans with an IDPA 
history.  The Appeal Board discovers the ”planning intention” of a statutory 
plan prepared by the Town Planning Board in various locations.  Some of 
the planning intentions are in statutory plans such as the OZP (see the Yuk 
Tong Estate and Leung Wing-nin cases), but others are in administrative 
plans such as Town Planning Board Guidelines (see the Lai Sun 
Development case).  As there is no restriction on the coverage of the notes 
themselves, it is difficult to understand the logic of the Appeal Board. 
Besides, it is a wrong approach, as statutory plans cannot be reduced or 
removed by any administrative declaration.   
What the Appeal Board usually gives out is not in line with planning 
intention for rejecting appeal cases.  Thirteen out of 17 appeals addressed 
this reason.  The problem of giving out something that is not in line with 
planning intention is mainly due to the location of the planning intention.  
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Only fee cases can locate it.  The following table shows the location of 
planning intention. 
However, the planning intentions of 13 cases were derived from the 
OZP.  This does not mean that the Appeal Board followed the planning 
intention stated in the OZP.  When it observed the planning intention from 
the Town Planning Board Guidelines (six out of 17 appeals) or from the 
Interim Criteria (four out of 17 appeals), it usually prevailed.  But one point 
to bear in mind is that those Town Planning Board Guidelines are 
administrative plans.  As a matter of law, they should not override the OZP.  
The exceptional case from these 17 appeals is the Hop Shing case.  In this 
case, the method of defining the planning intention for the “CDA” 
(Comprehensive Development Area) zone in the OZP was different from 
that of the other appeal cases.  The Appeal Board tried to understand the 
underlying planning intention for the zone, but did not purely take wordings 
from the explanatory notes of the “CDA” zone.  It tried to discover the 
planning intention of the usage from Columns 1 and 2.  As there are various 
ranges of usage that may be approved, it generated a concept that 
developments may be approved if there are no adverse environmental 
impacts. 
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The departure of planning intentions and the unclear location of 
planning intention results in uncertainty.  This will definitely restrict private 
property rights and result in high transaction costs.  
A Bad Precedent 
A bad precedent was usually used by the Appeal Board to dismiss 
appeal cases.  In all 17 cases, seven of them were dismissed with this reason.  
Usually the Appeal Board will make a statement like: 
 
It will set an undesirable precedent for other similar applications in 
the area.  The cumulative impact of the approval of similar 
applications would further degrade the environment of rural area62. 
 
However, this is definitely a wrong concept.  Whether a decision was 
a good or bad precedent can only be assessed from a third party’s point of 
view.  The Appeal Board should use its best judgment to make decisions.  
From a third party point of view, no bad precedent would arise if it 
considered that a case had to be accepted or rejected without unreasonable or 
wrong reasons.  This was not something the Appeal Board could preclude or 
avoid.  From a logical point of view, an undesirable precedent only happens 
when a good case is rejected or a bad case is approved.  The Appeal Board 
                                                 
62 Quoted from comments by the Appeal Board on the Lau Sui Kit Case. 
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objected to these cases.  This means that these were good cases, but were 
unreasonably rejected by the Appeal Board.  
Only two cases, the Hop Sing case and the Wong Wing Sun case, 
addressed the meaning of a bad precedent correctly.  The Appeal Board 
stated that:  
 
We do not consider that a lot of weight should be given to this factor. 
If an application is meritorious, we do not see why it should be 
disallowed simply because other people may make use of the success 
in the application in support of their applications in the future…each 
application should be considered on its own merits.63 
 
However, this view has rarely been expressed by the Appeal Board. 
 
Different from Previous Appeal cases 
Sometimes, the Appeal Board would consider previous appeal cases 
when deciding an appeal.  Five out of 17 cases had addressed this issue.  
However, the Appeal Board did not have a consistent view on it.  The 
appellants for the two allowed cases (Hop Shing and Wong Wing Sing) 
viewed that judges in appeal cases should decide each case on its own merits 
instead of simply following previous similar cases.  The reason for this is 
that no matter how similar two cases are, there still are some differences 
                                                 
63 Quoted from comments by the Appeal Board on the Hop Sing and Wong Wing Sun  
Cases. 
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between them.  However, appellants for the other three appeal cases viewed 
this issue differently.  
 
Presumption in favour of development 
The explained planning intention by the Appeal Board seemed to not 
favor development.  Statistical evidence showed that it was not easier to 
obtain planning permission for Column 2 uses in designated zones in the 
rural OZPs than for uses in Unspecified Use areas or zones in the DPA or 
IDPA Plans, especially in the Agriculture, Open Storage, and Industrial 
(Group D) Zones.  Presumption in favor of development did not take place, 
as even the designated zones with clear statutory plans did not serve to direct 
to or help development in the planned spot.  
Other than the direct impact on the proposed development area, the 
Appeal Board was also concerned with the cumulative impact of proposed 
development and other similar proposals in a given planning unit or area.  
This further reduced the chances for getting approval, as there seemed to be 
little guidance concerning the objective calibration of the “environmental” or 
“carrying” capacity of the relevant planning unit or area. 
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Zero nuisances 
Fourteen out of 17 cases addressed either “environmental impacts,” 
“not compatible with neighbor sites,” or even both when deciding appeals.  
Ten out of 17 cases were dismissed by the Appeal Board for one or both 
reasons.  Furthermore, three out of four successful cases were approved for 
one or both reasons.  This showed that environmental issues and impacts on 
neighboring sites were the main considerations of the Appeal Board when 
deciding on the appeals. 
Furthermore, the Appeal Board’s interpretation of planning intention 
was also not in favor of private development, and required almost zero 
nuisance to the public.  In the Ultra Force case, it stated that there was no 
presumption in favor of development for private projects.  Another example 
is the reference to “self-interest” regarding an application for a small metal 
workshop in the Kingspeed Engineering case, in which the appellant was a 
supplier contractor for the government.  The Delight World case was similar 
to these two cases.  In this case, the Appeal Board stated that: 
 
The Town Planning Board in the discharge of its statutory function to 
prepare plans for the “health, safety, convenience and general welfare 
of the community” must look to the public interest as a whole64. 
 
                                                 
64 Quoted from comments by the Appeal Board on the Delight World Case. 
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The Appeal Board has no obligation to please prospective developers.  
More radical views were shown in the Bowen Road case, when it ruled that 
an application that is beneficial to private individuals without demonstrating 
social benefits should not be approved.  But in the Treasure Base case, it 
stated that planning permission should be granted to the extent shown, 
provided for, or specified in the plan in regards to all material considerations 
unless there were good reasons for refusal.  However, it has rarely invoked 
this rule. 
The above examples showed that the attitude of the Appeal Board 
focuses on the public interest.  It ignores the net benefits or costs of an 
application to a planning area.  Private property rights on the lands are of 
little consideration.  
 
Appeal Board’s market assessment 
The Appeal Board seems to have its own set of market assessments.  
In the Lai Sun Investment case, it ruled that a use should not be approved if 
its future marketability is doubtful, but there was no need for the appellant to 
prove that any proposed use produced any planning gains.  A similar view 
was applied to the Lucky Gain and Fine Tower cases.  The Appeal Board 
relied on its own market assessment to conclude that there was unlikely to be 
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a market for the applied use, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.  It 
considers the issue of market trends to be a material consideration for 
approving or rejecting an application.  But Lai (1999) pointed out that the 
Appeal Board was actually making planning policies from its own 
perception of the market’s situation. 
Some may argue that expert evidence has influenced these decisions.  
Such expert evidence was considered by the Appeal Board mainly in 
connection with the commercial viability of agriculture, traffic, and 
environmental impact.  However, the Appeal Board would allow or dismiss 
an appeal by referencing other relevant considerations in order to form its 
own point of view, for instance, in the Yiu Cho Investment case.  
Besides, the Appeal Board is more ready to accept the views of expert 
witnesses for the respondent rather than those for the appellant.  Only in a 
few cases, such as the Bowen Road and Henderson cases, did the Appeal 
Board accept the appellant’s expert evidence.  Even the experts’ views for 
the appellant were not contested by the relevant departments, the Appeal 
Board may still ignore their views.  This rule was demonstrated in the Lucky 
Gain, Fine Tower, and Yau Sung Tak cases.  Sometimes the appellant’s 
proposal for mitigation measures would be accepted by the Appeal Board, 
but it would still be dismissed, as the Appeal Board would assume that the 
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applicant would not keep his/her promises, and the government would not 
enforce conditions of grant.  Although this approach was ruled out in the 
Henderson case, it was not consistently followed.  The Appeal Board’s 
attitude toward the appellant is extremely negative.       
In summary, the perception of the Appeal Board to the market is 
hostile.  Thus, it is not difficult to understand why the Appeal Board turns 
down most applications.  
 
A Reactionary position toward the appellant 
The Appeal Board tends to make fewer and shorter comments when 
the appellant is not represented.  But when s/he is represented by an 
advocate (e.g. professional planners, the public, etc.), or when the advocate 
defends the appellant’s position vehemently, the Appeal Board will address 
the appeal.  In conclusion, causal submission comes with causal reaction, 
and vice versa.  This action and reactionary attitude of the Appeal Board is 
unfair to the appellant, as it hardly considers all the material facts.  
Inconsistent rulings on appeal cases usually result, which definitely affect 
appellants’ private property rights.  
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Maximizing Social Benefits 
 The aim of the Town Planning Ordinance is to promote the health, 
safety, convenience, and general welfare of the community.  According to 
Lai (1994b, 1996, 1997a),65 empirical cost-benefit analysis is the underlying 
question for deciding whether land use is justified by the market or by the 
government’s visible hand.  Hence, justifiable grounds of objections and the 
practicality of using planning conditions should involve a balance of the 
costs and benefits of a use. 
As shown in its decisions, the Appeal Board never measures the 
economic impact on the site.  In the Cheng Cheung Fai case, the appellant 
claimed that “As unemployment is high, encouragement should be given to 
people who try to earn a living.” 66   However, the Appeal Board has 
responded negatively to private benefits, stating that: 
 
This case involves an owner who finds it convenient for his own 
purposes to let out the Unit for use as a barber shop…We are in no 
                                                 
65 Lawrence W.C. Lai, Property Rights Analysis of Zoning, PhD Thesis, (Hong Kong:  
Faculty of Architecture, the University of Hong Kong, February 1994b), 11 
________. Zoning and property rights : a Hong Kong case study Hong Kong : 
Hong  Kong University Press, 1996. and ________.“The Property Rights 
Justifications for Planning and a Theory of Zoning”. Progress in Planning. 48, 
no.3 (1997): 161. 
 
66 Quoted from comments by the Appeal Board on the Cheng Cheung Fai Case. 
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way persuaded of the existence of a genuine need to use the Unit as a 
barber shop.67 
 
In the Kin Si Construction case, the Appeal Board also made a similar 
rejection.  It stated that:  
 
It would be convenient for Kin Si to use the site as an extension to its 
existing open storage yard at the north.  However, we do not see any 
compelling reason to say that Kin Si could not make use of any other 
land other than the site for the expansion of its business.68 
 
 More to the point, in the Chow Ching Yee case, the Appeal Board 
further stated that:  
 
This is a case of an owner seeking monetary gain on the back of the 
right of an indigenous villager of an alien village.  In these 
circumstances very strong planning grounds must be advanced for the 
planning permission sought.69 
 
When justifying its decision in this case, the Appeal Board added that: 
 
Grant of approval…would set an undesirable precedent leading to the 
gradual erosion of the buffer.  Such risk far outweighs the potential 
monetary loss of Ms. Chow arising from denial of the planning 
permission sought.70 
 
 The above decisions showed that the Appeal Board negated the 
private benefits of the appellants.  This attitude was demonstrated more 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 Quoted from comments by the Appeal Board on the Kin Si Construction Case. 
 
69 Quoted from comments by the Appeal Board on the Chow Ching Yee Case. 
 
70 Ibid. 
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clearly in the Chuen Kee Motor Engineering case.  In this case, the Appeal 
Board stated that “it is not the public interest to grant any further permission 
to the appellant.”71  One point to bear in mind is that approval would have 
allowed the appellant to enjoy property rights over his/her land.  As private 
interests are part of social benefits, an approval would have maximized the 
gain.  Once in a while, the Appeal Board does protect private property rights.  
In the Wong Chuen Yuen case, it ruled that time should be allowed for the 
appellant to relocate his business because it would minimize the effect of 
town planning on individual property rights.  Other than this, the Appeal 
Board did not take notice of the above issue in most cases.  
 The main concern of the Appeal Board is the environmental aspect.  
In most appeals, environmental aspects were the major issue for deciding 
cases.  The Appeal Board always came up with wordings like, “cause 
adverse drainage impact on the surrounding areas,” “generate adverse 
environmental and drainage impacts [on] the surrounding areas,” or “no 
potential adverse impacts can be mitigated satisfactorily”.  This concern 
went to extremes in the Two Mr. Yaus case.  The Appeal Board expressed a 
view that “Noise pollution is not their personal matter”. However, in an 
economic sense, if social benefits are not harmed by private development, 
                                                 
71 Quoted from comments by the Appeal Board on the Chuen Kee Motor Engineering  
Case.   
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restricting private property rights will only harm society, as private benefits 
are part of social benefits.  Besides, many appellants are trying to make a 
tradeoff between the negative costs imposed by noise and the benefits 
derived from small house development.  Hence, the appellants, though these 
trades, maximize their gains, and Pareto efficiency is achieved.  
 As environmental concerns are the main aspects of approving an 
appeal case, the demonstration of no adverse impacts and mitigation 
measures are necessary.  These burdens fall heavily on appellants.  The 
Kwan Tak Wah case demonstrated this concept clearly.  The duties of the 
appellant included demonstrating no adverse environmental and drainage 
impact on the surroundings or any other potentially adverse impacts.  Also, 
the appellant had to provide mitigation measures to support his appeal.  The 
appellant was willing to pave the track and reduce noise and dirt nuisances, 
but was not granted a right of way.  Similarly, the appellant wanted to 
construct a surface water drainage system, but the Drainage Services 
Department said the work was substandard and commented that the 
appellant’s submission of a drainage proposal was insufficient.  
 The Appeal Board not only negated private property rights and the 
efforts of the appellants, but also had unrealistic market perspectives.  Nine 
out of 17 cases highlighted the issues of “alternative sites available”.  In only 
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two of these nine cases did the Appeal Board not agree to the logic of 
“alternative sites available”.  It stated that there would be alternative sites 
available for the appellants, and that the subject sites had alternative uses.  In 
the C&P Holdings case, it stated that there were plenty of areas zoned for 
open storage purposes.  The appellant could operate in those sites, although 
the cost may be higher.  Nevertheless, even a sufficient site does not mean 
that appellants could acquire lands within such zones for open storage uses. 
In the Kin Si Construction case, the Appeal Board stated that the 
subject site could be used for village type development, even though there 
were access problems since the land was locked.  There had to be a way to 
resolve the problem of access, because the site nearby had been used as plant 
nursery and for open storage.  Hence, there was no problem of access.  There 
has rarely been a case like the Wong Chuen Yuen case.  It showed hardly 
anyone now has an interest in suitable alternative uses such as commercial 
plants, flower gardens, and low-density housing, as suggested by the 
respondent.  The Appeal Board took a more realistic point of view that the 
alternative use may not be practical in a market economy, since land use 
decisions are subject to demand and supply.  The reason for the appellant’s 
development is because there was such a demand for that particular use, 
which could generate the greatest benefit for the appellant.  If alternative 
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uses were workable, then the appellant would have resorted to them without 
going though a long application process.  The motivation behind this is 
simple because there was no demand for an alternative.  Nevertheless, the 
logic displayed by the Appeal Board in the Wong Chuen Yuen case has 
rarely been repeated in other cases. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION: EFFECTS ON MARKET ECONOMY 
 Have analyzed the appeal cases in the pervious chapter, we may draw 
a few conclusions. 
Attenuation of Private Property Rights 
 Cheung (1974)72 defined private property rights as “The freedom of 
use, to derive income, and to alienate rights connected with a resource 
owned”.  In addition, the rights also include “The freedom not to exercise 
this use, income or alienation rights.”  The Appeal Board did not respect 
private property rights in most of the 17 appeal cases.  
Under the leasehold system, the government actually owns all land in 
Hong Kong.  The lease terms usually contain a variety of restrictions (e.g. 
site coverage, plot ratio, building height, minimum floor area, etc.) when 
portions of the land are sold at auctions or tenders.  Landowners (actually 
leaseholders) are expected to act according to their lease terms and the 
relative ordinances.  
Although private rights are largely restricted by land use planning 
through the zoning system, and contract terms are broken by the government 
legally through the use of a zoning system, there is clearly a delineation of 
                                                 
72 See Cheung, S.N.S. “A Theory of Price Control,” Journal of Law and Economics 17, 
 no. 1 (1974): 53-71.  
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statutory development rights.  However, in practice, the Appeal Board’s 
attitude towards appellants, as demonstrated by its decisions, harm the rights 
of appellants.  
Free to Use 
Landowners should have unrestricted rights to use their land if they 
act accordingly.  However, out of 17 appeal cases, only three were approved 
with conditions.  The locations of planning intentions discussed in the 
previous chapter support the argument that the Appeal Board did not rely on 
statutory plans, but administrative plans.  This fact explained why there is a 
low appeal success rate.  As a matter of law, this should not happen.  The 
Appeal Board usually does not consider approving appeals with conditions.  
In some cases, like the Kwan Tak-wah case, the appellant was willing to 
pave the track and reduce noise and dirt nuisances, but this right was not 
granted.  The appellant also wanted to construct a surface water drainage 
system, but the Drainage Services Department said that the work was 
substandard, and added that the appellant’s drainage proposal was 
insufficient.  The Appeal Board had ignored the efforts of the appellant.  To 
maximize the social benefit, the Appeal Board could have specified what 
was needed and approve cases with conditions rather than reject an appeal 
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outright.  This would restrict the common law rights of Crown Leases, 
which are essential for Hong Kong’s economic prosperity.  
Land Value 
Obviously, land values will decrease.  Extra costs are needed to pay 
for planning applications, reviews, and appeals.  They appear in the form of 
information searches, which seek evidence from experts and legal advice.  
Besides, appellants need to devote more effort to bring about mitigation 
measures.  As discussed before, heavy burdens were put on appellants to 
prove no environmental effects and provide mitigation measures.  High costs 
arose regardless if the applications were successful or not.  Costs also 
appeared because of the uncertainty of rejection reasons given by the Appeal 
Board.  For instance, it defined the concept of existing use differently in the 
Union Kind, Ltd. and Kin Si Construction cases.  In the former case, the 
Appeal Board ruled that the appellant did not have the power to define the 
existing use.  However, in the latter case, it confirmed that the appellant had 
such a power.  Appellants find such conflicting decisions difficult to follow, 
and such uncertainty brings them higher costs.  
Delays 
Even if appeals were approved by the Appeal Board, the requirement 
of planning permission means extra time is needed for a development.  From 
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these appeals, the time spent on a S.16 application to a final appeal decision 
averages about 16 months.  This means that the appellant has to spend extra 
resources to hold and manage the land for an indefinite period of time.  Also, 
a delay in commencing work also means delaying its completion.  
Landowners receive no compensation during this time, and they may even 
suffer economic losses. 
Gain and Loss 
Obviously, landowners despise this rent-seeking activity.  They pour a 
lot of resources into the appeals procedure, but only a few of them win their 
cases, so rent is dissipated, as in the abovementioned examples. 
 But the general public also suffers.  In a non-development 
environment, it may lose out on potential jobs, which was the crux of the 
appellant’s argument in the unsuccessful Cheng Cheung Fai case.  This 
showed that land development is a source of income for general public.  
 Although landowners suffer, some free riders gain from this unclear 
delineation of property rights and the hostile attitude of the Appeal Board.  
Professional planners, legal advisers, and surveyors can gain from such 
situations.  As appellants have to submit supporting evidence to the Appeal 
Board, surveys are always needed for getting planning permission.  If the 
appellant doesn’t perform this task, the Appeal Board can say, “No evidence 
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[was] given by [the] Appellant [to] support his claim.”  But the appellant 
still has to pay the professionals for their services.  
 Nonetheless, is it worth attenuating private property rights?  Planning 
is a matter of exercising discretionary power.  There are few procedural rules, 
and most of them are administrative guidelines.  The Appeal Board has 
discretionary power to rule out appeals.  This affects private property rights.  
As Hong Kong is under a market economy, such a restriction reduces the 
confidence of people in owning land, since land values may decrease in such 
circumstances.  Besides, planning matters and Appeal Board rulings 
contradict the Basic Law, which protects private property rights.  The Basic 
Law is a mini constitution whose terms must prevail.  
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Case Name: Lot 733 RP and Lot 764 in DD 99 in San Tin, Yuen Long for 
appeal no. 5. Lots 743RP; 745RP; 746RP and 748RP in DD 99 for appeal no. 
7 [Sun Hung Kai case].73 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 5/2000, 7/2000 
Nature of the Case:  
I. Applied for container storage and parking of container vehicles 
(appeal no.5) 
II. Applied for 3 years’ temporary use for container storage and container 
vehicle parking with ancillary workshop facilities. (appeal no. 7) 
Date of S.16 Application: 10 June 1999 (appeal no.5), 19 July 1999 (appeal 
no.7) 
Dates of Hearing: 15, 22, 26, 29&31 January 2002; 2, 5&7 February 2002; 2 
March 2002 
Date of Decision: 14 June 2002 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Ronny F.H. Wong S.C. 
 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Planning intention 
This case defined the planning intention in a logical sense.  It defined 
the planning intention from the statutory plan and its Explanatory Statement 
rather than only rely on the Town Planning Board Guidelines (Guidelines 
12B).  It is absolutely correct as a matter of law.  However, this rule is 
merely applied to other appeal cases.  One point to take note of is that the 
Appeal Board followed the Henderson Real Estate Agency, Ltd. v. Lo Chai 
Wan case [1997] HKLRD 258 at 261F (Henderson case) to interpret the 
planning intention for the zone. 
Every case considered by the Appeal Board will normally focus on 
planning intention.  The interpretation of planning intention becomes very 
important.  The certainty of how to locate planning intention is significant, 
as it will give the applicant a clear indication of planning intention.  This 
indication could help the prospective applicant be more certain of his/her 
chances of success before applying, and could reduce costs. 
 
 
                                                 
73 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2002.html. 
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II. Due regard  
The Appeal Board mandated that the appellant demonstrate that a 
“due regard has been given”.  In this case, the appellant had paid due regard 
to traffic, drainage, and ecology.  The issues of traffic and drainage 
addressed by the appellant were accepted by the Appeal Board, but the 
ecology issue was not.  Whether or not the reason for rejecting the appeal 
was reasonable is not the main concern.  The main point is that the Appeal 
Board placed all responsibility on the appellant.  
Besides, the Appeal Board and the appellant already devoted lots of 
time and energy to the appeal case.  It was unfortunate that the proposed 
development was not approved due to one reason.  To maximize society’s 
gain, the Appeal Board could have approved the case with conditions.  
However, it stated that the appellant: 
 
ha[s] to discharge that onus vis-à-vis this Appeal Board and not 
as part of any subsequent exercise in discharge of their duties 
under other relevant legislation.  
 
III. Action and reaction 
The appeal report used nearly 62 points in 26 pages to address all the 
issues.  Even the backgrounds of each witness were stated.  This does not 
happen often.  The reason for this more likely relates to the status of the 
appellant and his seriousness in pursuing the case.  The reactionary attitude 
of the Appeal Board was evident.    
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Fig. 2 The Subject Site of Sun Hung Kai Case (5/2000).74 
 
 
Fig.3 The Subject Site of the Sun Hung Kai Case (7/2000).75
                                                 
74 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
 
75 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lots No. 371 (part), 373 (part) and 385 (part) in DD110, Pat 
Heung, Yuen Long, New Territories [Tang Koon Yau case].76 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 8/2001 
Nature of the Case: Applied for temporary open storage of construction 
materials, machinery and container store-rooms for a period of 3 years 
Date of S.16 Application: 6 February 2001 
Dates of Hearing: 7 May 2002 
Date of Decision: 12 July 2002 
Chairman of the Panel: The Hon. Mr. Justice Lugar Mawson 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Undesirable precedent 
The Appeal Board definitely has a wrong concept of precedent.  
Whether a decision gave a good or bad precedent can only be assessed from 
a third party’s point of view.  The Appeal Board should have used its best 
judgment to make decisions.  From a third party point of view, no bad 
precedent would have arisen if it considered that a case had to be accepted or 
rejected without irrational or wrong reasons.  However, it was not something 
the Appeal Board could preclude or avoid.  Moreover, an undesirable 
precedent only happens when a good case is rejected or a bad case is 
approved.  The Appeal Board rejected this case, which meant that it was a 
good case, but was unreasonably denied by the Appeal Board.  
 
II. Incompatible with the surroundings  
South of the site, the land was zoned as Open storage use.  It is 
difficult to conclude that the open storage use in the subject area was 
incompatible with the surroundings.  It was unreasonable for the Appeal 
Board to reject the appeal for this reason. 
 
III. Alternative site 
This was a reasonable consideration, as there was sufficient land for 
development. However, this did not mean that the appellant could acquire 
land within the zone for such a development. 
  
 
                                                 
76 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2002.html. 
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IV. Duties of the appellant 
From this case, the duties imposed by the Appeal Board on the 
appellant were very heavy.  They included demonstrating that no adverse 
environmental and drainage impact would be effected on the surroundings.  
In addition, the appellant had to provide mitigation measures to support his 
appeal.  The private property rights of the appellant were restricted even 
though the appeal would be approved later.  The appellant had to pay extra 
costs for taking up the imposed duties in order to get approval for the 
development.  Sometimes, the Appeal Board issues approvals with 
conditions.  This helps ease the burden on the appellant.  Consequently, 
his/her costs may slightly decrease.  Nonetheless, there was an economic 
loss.  As shown in this case, the Appeal Board seems to discourage any land 
development.     
 
 
 
Fig.4 The Subject Site of Tang Koon Yau Case (8/2001).77
                                                 
77 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lots No. 480 (part), 482 (part), 488 (part), 489, 490 (part), 492 
(part) and 493 (part) in DD99 in San Tin, Yuen Long  
[Chuen Kee Motor Engineering case].78 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 9/2001 
Nature of the Case: Applied for use as a canteen and car wash area for a 
period of 3 years 
Date of S.16 Application: 27 April 2001 
Dates of Hearing: 3 July 2002 
Date of Decision: 31 July 2002 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Ronny F.H. Wong S.C. 
Representation:  
I. Mr. Simon Lau for the Respondent 
II. The appellant in person 
Decision: Appeal Dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Environmental concerns 
The Appeal Board only stated that the appellant made no 
attempt to tackle the environmental concerns raised by the Town 
Planning Board.  In other appeal cases, the Appeal Board would 
normally identify the environmental issues and the inadequacies of the 
appellant’s proposal.  However, in this case, it did not state any issues 
and dismissed the case with one statement.  This was not an 
acceptable reason for rejecting the appeal.    
 
II. Public interest 
The Appeal Board stated that:  
 
It is not [in] the public interest to grant any further permission 
to the appellant given the importance of the railway alignment 
and the current timing as outlined by Mr. Mok. 
 
This point of view raises several problems.  First, the appellant 
submitted the application on 27 April 2001, while the Spur Line scheme was 
gazetted on 7 December 2001.  The Appeal Board could not use this plan as 
                                                 
78 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2002.html. 
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a consideration for rejecting the appeal.  The relevant plan should have only 
been the San Tin Outline Zoning Plan.  
Besides, the Appeal Board had defined the intention of the plan, 
which was not stated in the San Tin Outline Zoning Plan.  It stated that 
because of the importance of the railway alignment and the current timing, 
thus permission should not be granted.  Planning power should have rested 
in the hands of the Town Planning Board, not the Appeal Board. 
The timing for land resumption should not be a relevant consideration, 
regardless if the Appeal Board approves or rejects an appeal.  The land still 
could be returned to the government under the Land Resumption Ordinance.  
But for the appellant, this was not the case.  An approval would have 
allowed the appellant to exercise his property rights over the land, and 
private interests would have led to social benefits.   
 
 
 
Fig 5. The Subject Site of Chuen Kee Motor Engineering Case (9/2001).79 
                                                 
79 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lot No. 642 in DD 121, Tong Yan San Tsuen, Yuen Long, New 
Territories [Kwan Tak-wah case].80 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 10/2001 
Nature of the Case: Applied for a temporary open storage space of building 
materials for a period of 3 years 
Date of S.16 Application: 25 April 2001 
Dates of Hearing: 4 June 2002 
Date of Decision: 26 July 2002 
Chairman of the Panel: The Hon. Mr. Justice Lugar Mawson 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Duties of the appellant 
The duties of the appellant were very heavy.  They included 
demonstrating that no adverse environmental and drainage impacts 
would be effected on the surroundings.  Moreover, the appellant had 
to provide mitigation measures to support his appeal. 
The appellant was willing to pave the track and reduce the noise 
and dirt nuisances, but was not granted the right to do so.  Similarly, 
the appellant wanted to construct a surface water drainage system, but 
the Drainage Services Department said the work was substandard and 
the appellant’s drainage proposal was insufficient. 
The Appeal Board ignored the efforts of the appellant.  To 
maximize the social benefits, the Appeal Board could have specified 
what was needed and approved the case with conditions rather than 
reject the appeal outright.  
 
II. Town Planning Board Guidelines 
In the application under Sections 16 and 17, the Town Planning Board 
Guidelines prevailed.  This guideline is an administrative plan.  It should not 
have been strictly followed or even allowed to prevail over the statutory plan 
(OZP).  As a matter of law, it could only act as a reference for rejecting an 
appeal case.  However, the Appeal Board did not cite this issue in rejecting 
the appeal. 
 
 
                                                 
80 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
 http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2002.html. 
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Fig. 6 The Subject Site of Kwan Tak-wah Case (10/2001). 81
                                                 
81 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lot 167 DRP (part) in DD 23, Wai ha Village, Tai Po  
[Lau Sui Kit case].82 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 5/2002 
Nature of the Case: Small House application 
Date of S.16 Application: 18 April 2002  
Dates of Hearing: 11 March 2003, 12 March 2003 
Date of Decision: 14 April 2003 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Ronny F.H. Wong S.C. 
Representation: 
I. Mr. Wan Hang Ping as the authorized representative of the Appellant.  
Decision: Appeal Dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Undesirable precedent 
As usual, the Appeal Board demonstrated a wrong concept like the 
other cases (Tang Koon Yau case, Tang Fook Cheung case, Chow Ching 
Yee case, Kin Si Construction case, and Union Kind Ltd case).  Further 
elaboration of this point could be found in the Tang Koon Yau case.  
 
II. Not a genuine application 
Although the appellant was tight-lipped on his ownership history, this 
should not have been used as a reason for rejecting his appeal.  The appellant 
admitted being an indigenous villager, and proved that he owned the site in 
question.  He should have had the right of application.  Besides, the Town 
Planning Board also confirmed the status of the appellant by accepting his 
application and review, so there should not have been a question over 
whether his application was genuine.   
 
III. No general shortage of land 
This was a reasonable consideration, as there was sufficient land for 
development.  However this did not mean that the appellant could acquire 
land within the zone for such a development.  This view was also expressed 
by Mr. Wan, who stated that “the alleged availability of land within the ‘V’ 
zone for Small house development” 
 
 
                                                 
82 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2003.html. 
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Fig. 8 The Subject Site of Lau Sui Kit Case (5/2002).83
                                                 
83 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx.  
 84 
Case Name: Lots 1368A (part) and Lot 1368BRP (part) in DD 82, Ping Che, 
Fanling [C & P Holdings case].84 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 2/2003 
Nature of the Case: Applied for temporary open storage space 
Date of S.16 Application: 24 June 2002 
Dates of Hearing: 10 June 2003, 11 June 2003 & 9 October 2003 
Date of Decision: 31 January 2004 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Edward Chan King-Sang 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines 
This guideline is an administrative plan.  The noise level suggested 
that it should not have been strictly followed.  Hence, it could only act as a 
reference, but not as a law, for rejecting an appeal case.  
 
II. Sufficient mitigation measures, but not sufficient for approving the 
appeal 
The Appeal Board accepted that there were sufficient measures for 
dealing with the noise pollution problems, and no nuisance was caused for 
the vicinity sites.  In addition, the drainage at the site experienced no 
problems.  However, the Appeal Board still rejected the appeal.  This was 
ironic, since the Appeal Board agreed with the evidence that the use of open 
storage space did not impose any burden on traffic nor any environmental 
problems.  The reason given by the Appeal Board could not be established. 
Moreover, the Appeal Board accepted that there was no adverse 
environmental impact, but repeatedly stated that it “would not [be] sufficient 
to make out a special case” for rejecting the appeal.  This was such an 
“empty reason” for rejecting an appeal, and is meaningless to the appellant.  
As a matter of law, the Appeal Board abused its discretionary power (broad 
ultra vires).  Its decision was ambiguous because it did not specify if the 
appellant could make any improvements.  Such uncertainty could raise 
transaction costs simply because the appellant would need to find out the 
real reasons for his rejection before making changes in the hopes of getting 
future approval.  Not only does the appellant suffer from such uncertainty 
                                                 
84 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2003.html. 
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(since he has lost his chance to utilize his land), but society suffers as well, 
as private benefits are part of social benefits.   
 
III. Environmental problems are created by mitigation measures 
Ancestral farm domestic structures and rural committee/village offices 
are in the Column 1 zone, while small houses and education centres are in 
the Column 2 zone.  This meant that the site did not remain a flat piece of 
land, as concrete structures were permitted to be erected on site.  The 
problem with building a wall was not established.  If the mitigation measures 
did not satisfy the EPD and the Appeal Board, they could have granted 
permission with conditions, since the appellant was willing to adopt all 
reasonable measures suggested by the EPD.  The reasons given by the 
Appeal Board were strange, and made it appear anti-development. 
 
IV. Small site involved 
Small sites could still be developed, especially in Hong Kong because 
the land is so limited and valuable.  The Appeal Board could not reason that 
small site development leads to sporadic and non-uniform land use, and then 
reject all development on the site.  The purpose of town planning is to 
maximize land use without restricting private property rights in the process 
and thus encouraging non-development.  A small land development could 
still benefit society and individuals.  
Besides, development on the site was allowed, as some uses were 
permitted through zoning.  There was just no intention of abundant 
development.  The Appeal Board should not have created the planning 
intention for the site or set any land use policy.  It could only decide on an 
application or appeal within the provisions of a plan, but it cannot create the 
planning intention for a zone by itself.  This power should rest in the hands 
of the Town Planning Board. 
 
V. Alternative site available 
This would be a reasonable consideration if there was sufficient land 
for development.  But neither the Appeal Board, nor the other government 
departments, nor the appellant found evidence that there was sufficient land 
for open storage use in this appeal case.  Even had there been sufficient land, 
the appellant still would not have been able to acquire lands within the zone 
for such a development.  
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Fig. 9 The Subject Site of C & P Holdings Case (2/2003).85 
                                                 
85 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lot 769 in DD 99 & Lots 3 (part) and 4 (part) in DD105, San 
Tin, Yuen Long, New Territories [Wong Chuen Yuen case].86 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 3/2003 
Nature of the Case: Applied for a 3-year temporary container trailer/tractor 
park 
Date of S.16 Application: 23 November 2001 
Dates of Hearing: 5 November 2002 & 7 November 2002 
Date of Decision: 19 November 2002 
Chairman of the Panel: The Hon. Mr. Justice Lugar-Mawson 
Representation:  
I. Ms. Yasmin Mahomed, Senior Government Counsel Department of 
Justice, for the Respondent. 
II. The Appellant, Mr. Wong Chuen Yuen, in person. 
Decision: Appeal allowed with conditions 
 
Comments 
 
I. No additional adverse impact on the environment 
Whether the development had any adverse impact on the environment 
should be based on the likelihood of future adverse impacts rather than the 
historical record of the appellant.  The Appeal Board took a correct view on 
this issue and decided that there would be no additional adverse impact on 
the ecology nor a further loss of wetland.  In an economic sense, past 
impacts are just historical costs.  When deciding whether permission should 
be granted, the Appeal Board should look at the opportunity costs of 
permitting the application.  In other words, it should consider if there would 
be any further or additional adverse impacts on the environment.   
 
II. Respect for property rights 
The Appeal Board viewed that time should be allowed for the 
appellant to relocate his business.  This would minimize the effect of town 
planning on individual property rights.  The site was zoned as Residential 
(Group D), and planning permission was granted.  
However, the zone was later rezoned as “Other Specified Use”.  The 
change of zoning and perception of the Town Planning Board harmed the 
appellant’s private property rights, as previously allowed uses were no 
longer permitted.  The appellant’s private property rights suffered from such 
                                                 
86 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2002.html. 
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changes.  Granting him time to relocate helped minimize his loss (i.e., a 
change of zoning), since the costs of relocation were cheaper. 
 
III. Demand and supply aspect 
The Appeal Board took a more realistic point of view that an 
alternative use may not be practical in a market economy, although it did not 
address the reason for why the demands of such alternative uses were low.  
Generally speaking, in a market economy like Hong Kong’s, land use 
decisions are subject to demand and supply.  The reason for the appellant’s 
development was simply that there was such a demand for that particular use 
that could generate the greatest benefit for him.  If the alternative uses were 
workable, then the appellant would have chosen one of them without going 
though a long process of getting planning permission.  But there was no 
demand for any alternative use.  The view of the Appeal Board was logical 
in this case. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 The Subject Site of Wong Chuen Yuen Case (3/2002).87
                                                 
87 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
 89 
Case Name: Lot no. 212 sB2 in DD 129, Deep Bay Road, Lau Fau Shan, 
Yuen Long, New Territories [Tang Fook Cheung case].88 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 4/2003 
Nature of the Case: Applied for a temporary warehouse for a period of three 
years 
Date of S.16 Application: 22 July 2002 
Dates of Hearing: 5 November 2003 & 6 November 2003 
Date of Decision: 12 December 2003 
Chairman of the Panel: The Hon. Mr. Justice Lugar-Mawson 
Representation: 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Drainage problems and Incompatibility with surrounding areas 
The appellant took numerous measures to deal with drainage and 
environmental problems.  This could be seen from his grounds of appeal.  
The Appeal Board should not have only stated that “The appellant did not 
demonstrate that there is no generation of adverse environmental and 
drainage impacts” merely to reject the appeal without further explanation.  
By doing so, it showed that it had a casual attitude towards the case. 
 
II. Undesirable precedent 
Further elaboration of this point could be found in the Tang Koon Yau 
case. 
 
III. Human rights 
As a matter of law, the view of the Appeal Board was correct.  It 
pointed out that the appellant had three bodies for considering his 
application with full rights of hearing at every stage.  But on the other hand, 
the town planners ignored the rights of proprietors (human rights).  They 
tend to ignore property rights and the effect on individuals when the ideas of 
“adverse environmental impacts” or “planning intention” are applied.  This 
approach contradicts the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s constitution, which 
expressly protects a market economy and private property.  Besides, the 
causal attitude of the Appeal Boards and its illogical reasons will eventually 
induce more problems concerning property rights. 
                                                 
88 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2003.html. 
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Fig. 10 The Subject Site of Tang Fook Cheung Case (4/2003)89.
                                                 
89 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Part of Lots 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2230, 2232 & 2233 in 
DD118, Sung Shan New Village, Tai Tong, Yuen Long  
[Wong Wing Sing case].90 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 5/2003 
Nature of the Case: Applied for a 3-year temporary shop for second hand 
electrical appliance and stainless steel kitchenware with ancillary facilities 
Date of S.16 Application: 26 July 2002 
Dates of Hearing: 14 July 2003, 17 July 2003 
Date of Decision: 30 August 2003 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Edward Chan King-Sang 
Representation:  
I. Ms. Tinny Ho and others for the respondent. 
II. Mr. Rock Tsang for the appellant. 
Decision: Appeal allowed with conditions 
 
Comments 
 
I. Planning intention 
The Appeal Board had the right attitude towards the planning 
intention for the zone.  It stated that: 
 
we must have due regard to the permitted uses on the zone on the 
OZP…it does not follow that we should never allow any use other 
than those permitted in the OZP, otherwise… no point in having any 
provision to allow…occupiers to apply for permission to use the land 
in a way different from that specified in the plan. 
 
II. Planning power 
The Appeal Board stated that: 
 
[with] regard to the actual situation at the site…and its vicinity 
in the past few years, it would not serve the purpose of retaining 
and safeguarding good agricultural land for agricultural 
purposes by refusing the appellant’s application…there is (not) 
much chance of the site being used for agricultural 
again…Certainty we do not see much prospect of the site being 
converted to actual agricultural use again in the next 3 years. 
                                                 
90 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2003.html. 
 92 
 
The reason given by the Appeal Board seemed to suggest that as there 
was no hope the remaining agricultural land, it should approve other types of 
use which were more suitable for the site.  This gives the impression that the 
Appeal Board is doing the planning for the site.  However, this power should 
not rest in its hands, but with the Town Planning Board.  The work of the 
Appeal Board should only be to examine appeals in accordance with its 
relevant statutory plans, even it does not agree with the appeals. 
 
III. Previous appeal cases 
The Appeal Board had the right view on the previous appeal cases.  It 
should decide on each appeal based only on its own merits. 
 
IV. Alternative sites 
The Appeal Board had the right view on this issue.  However, this 
point of view was merely applied to other similar cases. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 The Subject Site of Wong Wing Sing Case (5/2003)91.
                                                 
91 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lot No. 369 in DD 253 and Lot 367RP in DD 253  
[Two Mr. Yaus case].92 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 6/2003 & 7/2003 
Nature of the Case: Applied for small house developments 
Date of S.16 Application: 16 November 2000 for both appeal cases 
Dates of Hearing: 27 August 2003, 28 August 2003 & 25 September 2003 
Date of Decision: 3 December 2003 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr Ronny F.H. Wong S.C. 
Representation:  
I. Mr. Clifford Tavares for the Respondent  
II. Mr. Yau Chi Hang in person for appeal No. 6 
III. Mr. Yau Chun Kei for Mr. Yau Ngan Him for appeal No. 7 
Decision: Appeals dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Planning intention 
Three plans were combined to define the planning intention for the site, 
including the Outline Zoning Plan, Town Planning Board Guidelines, and 
the Interim Criteria.  In these three plans, only the Outline Zoning Plan was 
a statutory plan.  
The Guidelines and Interim Criteria are administrative plans published 
by the Town Planning Board.  They should only be referred to if and only if 
a statutory plan could not clearly define the planning intention for the area.  
They should not override the statutory plan (OZP).  In this case, the Appeal 
Board chose to solely follow the Interim Criteria and ignore other plans by 
stating that, “we further accept the evidence of Mr. Lau that no similar 
application has been approved after promulgation of the Interim Criteria.” 
Although the intentions of these three plans are more or less similar, the 
Interim Criteria contain very strict guidelines for getting approval.  Before it 
was put into practice, planning permissions were granted to various plots of 
land adjoining a site.  However, from the evidence given by Mr. Yau, “no 
other similar application for small house development has been approved 
after promulgation of those criteria.”  This shows that the Interim Criteria 
were more restrictive than the OZP.  The Interim Criteria go beyond the 
Explanatory Notes of the OZP.  If the intention of the OZP is to set many 
restrictions for the area, it is strange why it did not include these intentions 
                                                 
92 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2003.html. 
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or criteria in the OZP rather than stating them in the general practice 
(Interim Criteria). 
 
II. Noise pollution 
According to modern planning standards and land policies, the 
efficient use of land means putting land to its most valuable use without 
demonstrating any social harm.  In this case, the Appeal Board admitted that 
there was no adverse environmental effect on a nearby site, but only on the 
subject site.  If society is not harmed by private development, then 
restricting private property right will only harm society.  Besides, both 
appellants were willing to accept the negative effect of nearby traffic.  In an 
economic sense, they were planning to trade the negative costs posed by the 
noise for the benefits of small house development.  This achieves pareto 
efficiency, as gains will be maximized.  
Moreover, the appellants were willing to perform mitigation measures 
to address traffic noise problems and comply with the conditions imposed by 
the granting of planning permission.  It was unreasonable for the Appeal 
Board to decide that since the appellants did not introduce any concrete 
proposal to mitigate such adverse impacts, their case should be rejected.  It 
could have granted planning permission with conditions to the address noise 
problem. 
 
III. No general shortage of land within the “V” zone 
This was a reasonable consideration, as there was sufficient land for 
development.  However, this did not mean that the appellants could acquire 
lands within the zone for such a development.  This view was also taken by 
the Appellant, who stated that, “land [is] held largely by private 
individuals…unlikely that those individuals would countenance erection on 
their land….” 
 
IV. Previous appeal cases 
As stated before, the rule for judging an appeal case is that each case 
should be decided on its own merits instead of simply following previous 
similar cases.  This time, the Appeal Board did not find out the differences 
and made its judgment by relying on precedents. 
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Fig 12. The Subject Site of Two Mr. Yaus Case (6/2003)93. 
 
 
Fig. 13 The Subject Site of Two Mr. Yaus Case (7/2003)94. 
                                                 
93 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx.  
 
94 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Fig. 14 The Present Situation of the Subject Site of Two Mr. Yaus Case 
(6/2003). 
 
 
Fig. 15 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Two Mr. Yaus Case 
(7/2003). 
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Case Name: 758 sB RP (part) and 767 sB (part) in DD 46 [Thai and Metal 
Trading case].95 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 8/2003 
Nature of the Case: Applied for temporary open storage uses 
Dates of Hearing: 30 June 2004, 7 July 2004 & 21 July 2004 
Date of Decision: 21 September 2004 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Ronny F.H. Wong, SC, JP 
Representation: 
I. Mr. Josiah Lee instructed by the Department of Justice for the Town 
Planning Board 
II. Mr. Anthony Ismail instructed by Andre W.Y. Ng & Co. for the 
Appellants 
Decision: Appeal dismissed by a majority of 3-2 
 
Comments 
 
I. Undesirable precedent 
This view is rarely applied in appeal cases.  However, the view of the 
Appeal Board was absolutely correct, as it was a third party point of view. 
 
II. Not compatible with surrounding areas 
The members of the Appeal Board were divided in their views on the 
compatibility of the proposed use with surrounding areas.  The majority 
accepted the respondent’s view, while the minority took the appellant’s view.  
In this case, the evidence given by both parties was reasonable.  However, 
what is apparent is that most Appeal Board members would choose to trust 
the Town Planning Board and other government departments rather than 
appellants. 
 
III. Other similar applications 
The Appeal Board should not have used the reason “no justification to 
depart from the views expressed by the Town Planning Appeal Board in the 
June 1999 Decisions” to reject this case.  Every case should be treated 
individually. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2004.html. 
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Fig. 16 The Subject Site of Thai and Metal Trading Case (8/2003)96.
                                                 
96 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lots 836A & 836RP in DD 130 [Chow Ching Yee case].97 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 10/2003 
Nature of the Case: Applied for New Territories Exempted House 
Date of S.16 Application: 25 October 2002 
Dates of Hearing: 8 October 2003, 13 October 2003, 4 November 2003 
Date of Decision: 5 December 2003 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Ronny F.H. Wong S.C. 
Representation:  
III. Ms. Yasmin Mahomed (Senior Government Counsel) for the 
Respondent 
IV. Mr. S.W. Lai for Ms. Chow Ching Yee 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Planning intention 
Three plans came together to define the planning intention for the site, 
including the OZP, Town Planning Board Guidelines, and the Interim 
Criteria.  In these three plans, only the OZP was a statutory plan; the others 
were not.  
The Guidelines and the Interim Criteria were administrative plans 
produced by the Town Planning Board.  They should only be referred to if 
and only if the statutory plan could not clearly define the planning intention 
for the area.  They should not override the statutory plan (OZP).  In this case, 
the Appeal Board chose to only follow the Interim Criteria, while it ignored 
the other plans.  Although the intentions of these three plans were more or 
less similar, the Interim Criteria provided very strict guidelines for getting 
approval.  Before the Interim Criteria came into practice, planning 
permissions were granted to various plots of land adjoining the site.  
However, there was only one successful application (Application 91) after 
the advent of the Interim Criteria.  This shows that the Interim Criteria was 
more restrictive than the statutory plan (OZP) because it went beyond the 
latter’s Explanatory Notes.  If the planning intention of the OZP had 
recommended many restrictions for the area, it is unclear why it did not 
include these intentions or criteria into the OZP rather than stating them in 
the general practice (Interim Criteria). 
 
 
                                                 
97 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2004.html. 
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II. Undesirable precedent  
Further elaboration of this point could be found in the Tang Koon Yau 
case. 
 
III. Rezoning rights 
The Appeal Board does not have the power to decide whether the 
zoning is right or wrong.  Its duty is to consider on the facts and the statutory 
plans when deciding on appeal cases.  Planning power should rest in the 
hands of the Town Planning Board.  The Appeal Board should make 
comments like, “We have reviewed the site in the context of the OZP.  We 
have no doubt that it falls within the important buffer area between [the] 
Yuen Long Highway and the residential development to it north.” 
 
IV. Property rights 
The Appeal Board should not reject an appeal simply because the 
owner wants to seek monetary gain.  The owner has the right to decide how 
to use her own property to maximize her gains, as long as she does not harm 
the nearby environment.  In this case, neither the respondent nor the 
appellant had addressed the environmental effect, which was stated in the 
OZP as one of the criteria for deciding on an application. 
 
V. Alternative sites were available 
This was a reasonable consideration, as there was sufficient land for 
development.  However, Lai pointed out that those lands in the Village Type 
development zone may not suitable for small house development.  He added, 
however, that this does not mean that the appellants could acquire lands 
within the zone for such a development. 
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Fig. 17 The Subject Site of Chow Ching Yee Case (4/2003)98. 
 
 
Fig. 18 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Chow Ching Yee Case 
(8/2003). 
                                                 
98 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Fig. 19 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Chow Ching Yee Case 
(8/2003). 
 
 
Fig. 20 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Chow Ching Yee Case 
(8/2003). 
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Case Name: Part of Lot 2483 in DD 104 at Ngau Tam Mei, Yuen Long  
[Kin Si Construction case].99 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 12/2003 
Nature of the Case: Application for temporary open storage use for own use 
Date of S.16 Application:  
Dates of Hearing: 3 December 2003 & 4 December 2003 
Date of Decision: 11 February 2004 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Edward Chan King-Sang 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Not in line with planning intention 
In this case, the Appeal Board defined the planning intention for the 
Village Type development zone.  It stated that the site: 
 
…does not mean that no commercial or non-residential use or non-
agricultural use would be permitted…However, open storage is not 
included in either column…the definition of ‘New Territories 
Exempted House’ would permit the use of the ground floor of such 
exempted houses for retail purposes, this would mean that certain 
commercial retail activities may be conducted at the site. 
 
The Appeal Board agreed that commercial use would be allowed.  
However, it rejected the open storage use purpose by saying it was “not 
compatible with the planning intention” without offering any explanation.  
The planning intention defined by the Appeal Board seemed to suggest open 
storage use, as commercial activities are allowed in the zone, but the Appeal 
Board rejected this.    
 
II. Departure from planning intention 
It is important that the Appeal Board mention the possibility that there 
could be a departure from such an intention if there was “special reason” for 
it.  In the other words, the Appeal Board seemed to suggest that the concept 
of “planning intention” was flexible.  But a possibility of departure from 
planning intention, if strong justification is provided, would not reduce, but 
instead increase, uncertainty.  As a matter of law, town planning must be 
clear, and the intention behind any plan must be definitive.  There cannot be 
                                                 
99 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2004.html. 
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any departure from it even if the zoning objective is wrong.  To allow a 
departure from the “intention” means that the intention of the plan was 
ambiguously or unlawfully spelled out in statutory plans and/or any 
administrative documents.  The Appeal Board must decide an application or 
appeal within the provisions of the plan, but it should not create any 
planning intention for a zone by itself.  This power should rest in the hands 
of the Town Planning Board. 
 
III. Zero nuisance rule 
It is ironic that the Appeal Board agreed with Mr. Chiu’s submission, 
in which the use of open storage did not impose any burden on traffic, nor 
create any environmental problems.  But it still reasoned that, “…a small 
impact on the surrounding area is not per se sufficient to justify the departure 
from the zoned purpose.”  As the Appeal Board accepted that there would be 
no adverse environmental effect, it should have approved the case. 
 
IV. Undesirable precedent 
Further elaboration of this point could be found in the Tang Koon Yau 
case. 
 
V. Alternative site was not available 
Even if there was a sufficient site nearby for the appellant to develop, 
this would simply be theoretical planning without actual market support.  In 
other words, the appellant was not guaranteed a comparable nearby site for 
his intended development.  Besides, even the Appeal Board admitted that 
there would be no adverse environmental effect.  If the social benefit was 
not harmed by private development, attenuating the appellant’s private 
property rights will only harm society, as private benefits are part of social 
benefits. 
 
VI. Judgment on the zoning 
The Appeal Board should not have the power to judge whether the site 
was suitable for small house development.  Besides, it should not have 
rejected the open storage use intention because there was an alternative use 
for the site. 
 
VII. Concept of the existing use 
The Appeal Board defined the existing use of the site at great length.  
However, the power of defining existing use should rest in the hands of the 
court.  If it is an existing use, there is no need for an application and appeal.  
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The Appeal Board should have had no jurisdiction to determine whether an 
existing use for the site is valid.  This is because the purpose of the Appeal 
Board is to review decisions by the Town Planning Board in respect of 
planning applications.  The Appeal Board exceeded its jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
Fig. 21 The Subject Site of Kin Si Construction Case (12/2003)100.
                                                 
100 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Lots 695A to 695F in DD 84, Sheung Shan Kai Wat Village in 
Ta Twu Ling [Choi Fung Keung case].101 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 13/2003 
Nature of the Case: Appeal to erect four New Territories Exempted Houses 
[Small House] in an Agriculture Zone dismissed; planning intention.  
Date of S.16 Application: 31 October 2002 
Dates of Hearing: 10 February 2004 and 12 February 2004 
Date of Decision: 9 March 2004 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Ronny F.H. Wong S.C. 
Representation:  
I. Mr. Peter T.K. Ip for the respondent the Town Planning Board 
II. Mr. Raymond W.C. Hui of Proper Trip Surveyors Ltd., Counsel for 
the Appellants. 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Planning Intention 
In this case, the Appeal Board did not state clearly that the use is not 
in line with planning intention for the Agriculture Zone, but stated that 
“Given the lack of any pressing demand, we are of the view that the 
planning intention in relation to the ’Agriculture’ zone must prevail.”  In 
other words, as the house is not in line with planning intention and there is 
no pressing demand for it, it should not be approved.  
The Appeal Board ignored the fact that small house development is a 
Column 2 use in the Agriculture Zone.  Although this does not mean that 
any application will be approved, it also does not mean that allowing the 
development of a house is a principle that is not consistent with the 
“planning intention” stated in a plan, as the development may permitted by 
the plan with or without conditions. 
 
II. Sufficient Land in the Village Type Development Area Zone 
There is sufficient land for such a development, but this doesn’t mean 
that the appellant is able to acquire those sites for it.  This is because there is 
insufficient market supply.  
 
 
 
                                                 
101 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2004.html. 
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Fig. 22 The Subject Site of Choi Fung Keung Case (13/2003)102.
                                                 
102 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: DD 130, San Hing Tsuen, Lam Tei, Tuen Mun, New Territories  
[Union Kind Ltd. case].103 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 17/2003 
Nature of the Case: Application for a temporary office and open storage use 
for 3 years 
Date of S.16 Application: 30 December 2002 
Dates of Hearing: 12 May 2004 and 13 May 2004 
Date of Decision: 9 August 2004 
Chairman of the Panel: The Hon. Justice Lugar-Mawson 
Representation:  
I. Mr. To Ho Sum for the respondent 
II. Mr. Kwok Wai Ming for the appellant  
Decision: Appeal Dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Planning intention 
There are two issues.  First, the office use is a Column 2 use in the “R 
(E)” zone.  Although this does not mean that any application has to be 
approved, it does not mean that allowing temporary office use is in a 
principle that is not consistent with “planning intention”.  Another issue is 
that the open storage use is not a Column 1 or Column 2 use in the “R (E)” 
zone.  However the appellant applied for a temporary open storage use, 
which is under the cover pages of the Notes.  Thus, a use not in line with 
planning intention for objection is reasonable if it contradicts the planning 
intention for an “R (E)” zone. 
 
II. Planning intention from Guidelines  
Guidelines are administrative plans produced by the Town Planning 
Board.  The Guidelines should be referred to only if the statutory plan could 
not clearly define the planning intention for the area.  Guidelines should not 
override the statutory plan (OZP).  As open storage use is not stated in the 
Column 1 and Column 2 uses of the OZP, and inexplicit conditions for open 
storage uses approval is found in the OZP, the Appeal Board’s decision, by 
referencing the Guidelines, was acceptable. 
But which guidelines should the Appeal Board have taken into 
consideration, Guidelines 13B or Guidelines 13C?  In the important notes of 
TPB PG-No.13C, it stated that “the Town Planning Board will only make 
                                                 
103 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2004.html. 
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reference to the guidelines current at the date on which it considers an 
application.” under Section 16 of the Town Planning Ordinance.  However, 
should the Town Planning Board and Appeal Board make reference to the 
guidelines in effect on the dates in which they consider a planning review 
and appeal, respectively?  In this case, both the Appeal Board and the Town 
Planning Board used the most updated guidelines for deciding on the appeal 
and planning review.  
It is correct for the Town Planning Board to make reference to the 
current guidelines when considering an application, but it is wrong for them 
to always use this principle.  Since the application that goes under the 
planning appeal will take a long time, if the guideline varies a lot during this 
period, the decision of review and appeal may be different due to different 
guidelines.  This could not happen in a legal matter. 
 
III. Strong justification for departure from planning intention 
This reason was recently used by the Appeal Board to reject appeal 
cases.  However, it has resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes.  It seems to 
suggest that the concept of “planning intention” is flexible, and there is a 
possibility of departure from the planning intention if strong justification is 
provided.  As a matter of law, certainty is essential.  To allow a departure 
from the “intention” means that the intention of the plan is ambiguously or 
unlawfully spelled out in statutory plans and/or any administrative document.  
As previously mentioned, the Appeal Board must decide on an appeal within 
the provisions of the plan, and the power of town planning should rest in the 
hands of the Town Planning Board. 
 
IV. The concept of existing use 
If there are any arguments on the concept of existing use, they should 
be defined by the court rather than by the Appeal Board.  This idea was 
correctly applied by Appeal Board in this case.  
 
V. Variation of Town Planning 
In ten years’ time, town planning has changed a lot.  In 1993, the area 
was zoned “R(E)”, then it changed to a “U” and “I (D)” zone in 1996.  It 
changed back to an “R(E)” zone in 1999.  Apart from the changed statutory 
plan, the Town Planning Board Guidelines also changed the classification of 
the area from a “no-go” area to a Category 4 area.  Even the owner of the 
site stated this in his appeal: 
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The site was the subject of a previous application for New Territories 
Exempted Houses. This was rejected by the TPB because the area is 
now zoned for residential use. This creates severe difficulties for 
Union Kind, Ltd., the owner of the site, as it is uncertain how the site 
can be developed. 
 
Although this could not be grounds for an appeal, the Town Planning 
Board should have noticed this problem.  Many variations of town planning 
will make the owner of the site suffer rather without benefiting the public.  
This harms the private property rights of the owner to develop the site as he 
sees fit.  The town Planning Board should have considered private property 
rights when deciding on any variation of town planning. 
 
VI. Zero nuisance rule 
It is ironic that the Town Planning Board rejected the application 
because it was incompatible with the nearby residential uses and the passage 
of vehicles.  After all, other workshop factory and storage uses were located 
nearby.  Thus, the application’s incompatibility with nearby residential uses 
and the passage of vehicles could not be established. 
 
VII. Undesirable precedent 
Further elaboration of this point could be found in the Tang Koon Yau case.  
 
 
 
Fig. 23 The Subject Site of Union Kind Ltd. Case (17/2003)104. 
                                                 
104 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Fig. 24 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Tang Fook Cheung Case 
(4/2003). 
 
 
Fig. 25 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Union Kind Ltd. Case 
(17/2003).
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Case Name: Lot 194 in DD 128, Ha Tsuen, New Territories [Hop Shing 
case].105 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 21/2003 
Nature of the Case: Application for temporary open storage space for own 
use 
Date of S.16 Application: 21 March 2003 
Dates of Hearing: 18 March 2004 & 5 May 2004 
Date of Decision: 18 June 2004 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Edward Chan King-sang 
Representation:  
I. Mr. Man Ming Fai for the appellant 
Decision: Appeal allowed with conditions 
 
Comments 
 
I. Planning intention 
This case defined the planning intention in a logical sense, unlike 
other similar cases.  First, it defined the planning intention from the statutory 
plan (“CDA” plan) rather than only relying on the Town Planning Board 
Guidelines (Guidelines 13C, Category 2).  This is absolutely correct as a 
matter of law.  However, like other appeal cases, some Appeal Board 
members relied heavy on the Guidelines rather than on the statutory plans.  
Besides, the method of defining the planning intention for a “CDA” 
zone is different from other appeal cases.  The Appeal Board tried to 
understand the underlying planning intention of the zone instead of purely 
taking wordings from the Explanatory Notes of the “CDA” zone.  However, 
it tried to determine this from the usage in Columns 1 and 2.  As there are 
various ranges of usage to be approved, developments may be approved if it 
has been determined that there would be no adverse environmental impact. 
This approach is reasonable for defining planning intention.  The 
planners put those uses under Columns 1 and 2 to indicate that those 
developments do not conflict with the planning intention for the zone.  They 
used examples to determine the possible developments in the area.  This 
approach gives a clearer picture of what kind of development applications 
are more likely to be approved. 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2004.html. 
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II. No traffic congestion on Deep Bay Road 
The Appeal Board tried to find out whether there was any adverse 
environmental effect nearby.  It did not simply rely on the comments given 
by various government departments.  Besides, it took all factors into account, 
including the appellant’s witness and the existing environment.  Plenty of 
material evidence was given by the Appeal Board to support its view that 
there was no traffic congestion impact on Deep Bay Road.  This attitude 
differed much from other appeal cases, as most of them will simply consider 
the views of government departments.  This attitude is very important for 
implementing town planning policies.  If a site is believed to have no 
adverse environmental effect, then private property rights should be 
respected and the application should be allowed. 
 
III. Undesirable precedent 
Most of the Appeal Board members did not use this approach.  Their 
view is correct, as an undesirable precedent ruling could only be made by a 
third party.  However, this view has rarely been expressed in other appeal 
cases. 
 
IV. Different from the previous applications 
The best rule for judging an appeal case is that each case should be 
decided on its own merits instead of simply following the previous similar 
cases.  This is because no matter how similar two cases are, there will be 
some differences between them.  This time, the Appeal Board found out the 
differences and judged accordingly.  This is an important rule for judging 
appeal cases, but it has rarely been applied to other applications, which 
instead used the undesirable precedent approach. 
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Fig. 26 The Subject Site of Hop Shing Case (21/2003)106.
                                                 
106 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Case Name: Unit 4, G/F, Hang Wai Industrial Centre, 6 Kin Tai Street, Tuen 
Mun [Cheng Cheung Fai case].107 
Planning Appeal Case No.: 22/2003 
Nature of the Case: application for a temporary barber shop for a period of 5 
years 
Dates of Hearing: 19 April 2004 
Date of Decision: 28 May 2004 
Chairman of the Panel: Mr. Ronney F.H. Wong S.C., J.P. 
Representation: 
I. Ms. Jenny Fung (Senior Government Counsel/Department of Justice) 
for the respondent. 
II. Cheng Cheung Fai is in person as the appellant. 
Decision: Appeal dismissed 
 
Comments 
 
I. Not in Line with planning intention 
The Appeal Board ignored the fact that a retail shop use is a Column 2 
use in the Industrial Zone.  Although this does not mean that any application 
has to be approved, it does not mean that allowing a barber shop is in a 
principle that is not consistent with the “planning intention” stated in a plan, 
as it may be permitted by the plan with or without conditions. 
 
II. The relevance of the Town Planning Board Guidelines from an 
administrative law perspective 
The Town Planning Board Guidelines were accepted as a key 
consideration by the Appeal Board for deciding on the case.  The weight of 
the Guidelines was as high as the OZP, its Notes, and their Explanatory 
Statements.  But the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines are 
produced by the Planning Department, which makes it an administrative 
document rather than a statutory plan.  Administrative plans could only be 
relied on to decide on the planning intention if and only if the statutory plans 
could not be clearly defined.  
However, in this case, the Appeal Board totally relied on the planning 
intention defined in the Guidelines without taking into consideration the 
OZP. 
 
 
                                                 
107 This case comes from the Town Planning Appeal Board website:  
http://www.hplb.gov.hk/tpab/chi/decisions/2004.html. 
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III. Alternative site was available 
This is a reasonable consideration, as there was a sufficient unit in the 
Kin Wing Commercial Building.  However, this does not mean that the 
appellants could simply acquire the unit within this building for a barber 
shop. 
 
IV. Zero Nuisance rule 
It is ironic that the Town Planning Board, because of fire safety 
reasons, rejected this application, as other retail shops, such as a cake shop, 
canteen, and vehicle repair shop, were located nearby. Thus, the reason 
could not be established.  Apparently, the Town Planning Board found some 
other reasons to reject the application.  But luckily for the appellant, they 
were not addressed by the Appeal Board. 
 
V. Efficient use of land 
This was agreed upon by the Appeal Board, as it didn’t mention again 
the evidence given by Mr. Liu as the reason for dismissing the case.  It chose 
to dismiss the case because there was no genuine need to use the unit as a 
barber shop.  This is unacceptable, as the owner should have been allowed to 
choose what to do with his property to maximize his returns. 
The Appeal Board’s attitude towards the market was passive, as it 
stated that: 
 
This case involves an owner who finds it convenient for his own 
purposes to let out the Unit for use as a barber shop…We are in no 
way persuaded of the existence of a genuine need to use the Unit as a 
barber shop. 
 
VI. The true purpose of controlling barber shop uses in Industrial 
buildings 
The reason is money rather than fire safety or a lack of a genuine need 
to use the unit as a barber shop.  As industrial premises are cheaper, which 
bring the government less land premiums, if commercial activities (such as a 
barber shop) are carried out there, government revenue would be less and 
unfair to those operating in land held under commercial leases (like the 
tenants in the Kin Wing Commercial Building).  Besides, this will also 
reduce suitable industrial floor space for ordinary industrial operators and 
thus reduce revenue.  
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Fig. 27 The Subject Site of Tang Fook Cheung Case (4/2003)108. 
 
 
Fig. 28 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Cheng Cheung Fai Case 
(22/2003). 
                                                 
108 Quoted from Town Planning Board website http://www.ozp.tpb.gov.hk/default.aspx. 
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Fig. 29 The Present Situation of Subject Site of Cheng Cheung Fai Case 
(22/2003).
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